Question:

May I ask for the source for this number, where can I see this on FinMin's website: CZK 142.4bn in net bond sales from the issuer's portfolio.

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Finance ministry borrows CZK 5bn through a 52-week T-bill

Answer:

The easiest way to track this is through the CNB's site, here:

https://www.cnb.cz/en/financial-markets/treasury-securities-market/medium-and-long-term-bonds/sd/

There is a spreadsheet available, which is usually updated at about 14:00 CET on Thursdays following government bond auctions, after non-competitive bids are resolved. The column you need is called "MoF bought into its books". You can see the numbers a bit earlier, at around 12:00 CET, here:

https://www.cnb.cz/en/financial-markets/treasury-securities-market/medium-and-long-term-bonds/government-bond-auctions-results/

However, this page has information only about the latest bond auction, while the first link has an archive since 2022.

Question:

I am trying to understand to what extent this nice trend in PMIs could be related to specific industries -- such as auto or defence. Can you please elaborate?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Manufacturing PMI improves to 53.9 in June, better than expected

Answer:

Unfortunately, PMI data that is available for free does not offer a breakdown by manufacturing sectors. Since this doesn't come up often in our work, we don't have a budget to pay for more granular data. If you ask for our personal take, we would guess that it is most likely the automotive sector that drove this increase, mostly because of lower fuel prices seen in June. As far as defence is concerned, we are not certain how well the PMI covers it, as before the Russia-Ukraine war, it wasn't as prominent as it is now.

Question:

Do you have a link for this data? I assume, over time, CPI prices should converge to these wholesale prices as contracts are renewed?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Electricity offer prices inch up in June, natural gas prices fall

Answer:

Regarding energy offer prices, you can locate the source by clicking on "Data source" at the very bottom of the article. A quick note - these are retail energy prices, i.e. what households get when they sign a contract. We are using final prices, including VAT and applicable fees. The link follows below:

https://eru.gov.cz/ipnc

The data series is available in two CSV files, one for electricity and one for natural gas prices.

As far as wholesale natural gas prices are concerned, we take these from the European Energy Exchange, here is a link:

https://www.eex.com/en/market-data/market-data-hub

We are looking at the Czech market in particular, the label for it is CZVTP.

As far as retail energy prices are concerned, indeed, we expect them to eventually converge to offer prices. However, this is assuming that offer prices remain unchanged. The main issue is that we haven't been able to find any information about the structure of household energy contracts, so we are completely in the dark about what share of these contracts expire soon and when exactly. This is why we call this a potential impact on inflation, as it could be less if offer prices decrease in the coming months, or more, if they start rising again. Still, we consider it a decent forward-looking indicator, which is why we started covering it. It is a fairly new release, which launched in April, so we hope they eventually add more information.

Question:

What was the impact on CPI of lowering the excise tax? And what is the revenue lost annually?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Parliament passes law for removing fuel price cap

Answer:

We have not seen such estimates from official sources. The excise tax cut, however, would not have any effect on consumer inflation. Excise taxes were reduced as a complementary measure to the introduction of the fuel price cap, so the intention of the reduction was only to alleviate any price pressures along the supply chain. Otherwise, the government announced that the nominal size of the excise tax cut for gasoline was HUF 19.25 per litre of gasoline and HUF 20.48 per litre of diesel. Applied over the capped gasoline price of HUF 595 and the capped diesel price of HUF 615, the excise tax cut would have reduced fuel prices by 3% on average and CPI - by 0.1-0.2pps, according to our calculations. Again, there was no disinflationary impact in reality because the fuel price was fixed anyway.

We cannot reliably estimate the budgetary impact. If this sort of reference would help, the Fidesz government had also temporarily waived the automatic indexation of the fuel excise tax, which was due to take effect from the beginning of 2026. The government had said that the hike would have raised fuel prices by HUF 8-9 per litre and estimated the related fiscal impact at HUF 15-20bn.

Question:

I am looking for data regarding EU flows to Hungary. Is there any chance you track this data and have it to hand?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Government to submit revised 2026 budget by end-August

Answer:

We are not aware of a time series data set containing the EU fund flows to Hungary by instrument. If the instrument breakdown is not crucial, probably the best data series could be found in the central bank's balance of payment statistics, which has a separate sheet about EU transfers and contains all flows to and fro from the EU budget. For a snapshot on the current state of EU fund absorption by instrument, the EC has a detailed cohesion policy portal, updated daily.

Question: Which specific bills of these nine were adopted on 30 June? And then which are still pending, ahead of the possible extraordinary session. Can you please confirm that all have been already submitted, i.e. there's no need for a new government to propose these measures to the parliament?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Status of pending reforms in NRRP

Answer: The parliament approved the water management bill, a law partly covering tax authority reform, digitisation in research bill, a law with new rules for public investment using RRF funding and a bill regulating the use of degraded state‑owned land for renewable energy capacities on Jun 30. The rest are still pending for approval in the extraordinary session. According to government representatives' statements to the media, a new cabinet is not required to submit these bills to the parliament. However, several provisions still lack political agreement with the PSD. The most problematic remains the public‑sector wage law, which MPs might modify during the legislative process.

Question: Can you please confirm legislation status of the pending reforms. Have the bills been submitted to the parliament? who submitted them - was it Bolojan's cabinet before 5 May? As the interim gov does not have legislative initiative right how might those outstanding pieces of legislation be dealt with?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Absorption from RRF can reach 95% with rapid reform adoption - Minister Pislaru

Answer: Government representatives have often stated that all nine bills regulating the reforms required to access RRF money, as listed by PM Bolojan, are drafted and ready to be debated and voted. None has been fully approved so far and for some, political disagreement occurred in the meantime, since the political crisis intensified. Here is the status of those reforms:

1. Integrity in the public sector - project is delayed due to political disagreements (EUR 771mn)
2. Urban planning and construction - approved by the Senate, blocked in the Chamber of Deputies (EUR 972mn)
3. Energy transition - approved by the Senate, blocked in the Chamber of Deputies. It is not fully compliant with EC requirements (some mines will be closed with delay, part of funds will likely be lost) - EUR 771mn
4. Heating and household energy - approved by the Senate, specialised committees are expected to submitted to the Chamber of Deputies (EUR 771mn)
5. Tax authority reform - delayed (EUR 771mn)
6. Water‑resource management - ready to be submitted to the parliament (EUR 972mn)
7. Public‑sector wages - blocked in the parliament due to political disagreement (EUR 770mn)
8. State‑owned companies governance - partly implemented, EUR 300-400mn pending RRF money for the unimplemented part
9. Degraded state‑owned land use for renewable energy capacities - blocked in the parliament (EUR 771mn)
   

The caretaker cabinet does not have legislative initiative, but most of them are already in the parliament. In order for them to be implemented, the parliament must hold extraordinary sessions this summer. The USR, PNL, UDMR and some PSD speakers are already talking about this.

Question:

Does the new mechanism for sovereign fund budget transfers entail an explicit monthly quota? What impact do you expect it to have on the FX market?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: NBK projects FX sales from sovereign fund at USD 200-300mn in July

Answer:

There is a degree of ambiguity in the NBK's current statement. On the one hand, it stresses that transfer sales will be mirrored by the bank through evenly distributed sales. On the other hand, the USD 460mn purchase is described as a June operation, suggesting an initial positioning step, as opposed to a recurring flow assumption. It is also worth highlighting that the new distribution scheme was not used in Jan-May, so an explicit monthly quota would not have applied in any case.

Coupled with the emphasis on actual budget financing needs, this indicates that for now the mechanism is more complex than a uniform monthly pattern. In terms of market impact, we expect reduced volatility in month-to-month FX sales, as the linkage between a particular month's budget execution and direct FX supply will weaken. However, because the annual sovereign fund transfer will still be set in the budget framework, overall market dynamics will remain predictable. The change only affects the intra-year absorption of that fixed fiscal envelope.

Question:

What impact do you expect from President Tokayev's base rate comment?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: President urges development of new economic model

Answer:

In simple terms, the NBK is likely to accommodate President Tokayev's vision on the balance between inflation management and economic stimuli if one is conveyed emphatically. Tokayev already referenced the base rate in a parliamentary address delivered in 2023. At the time, he criticised the NBK for maintaining a 'high' base rate that elevated bank profits and did not support the economy.

Shortly after that, NBK governor Pirmatov was replaced by the current governor, who came from the presidential administration. His first decision as governor was to deliver a rate cut that was perceived as a political decision, not one driven by market conditions. The governor had to give an interview justifying the move, in which he denied being subservient and claimed he had not been aware of Tokayev's base rate comments. At the start of governor Suleimenov's tenure, the president would also hold regular meetings with him around the dates of base rate decisions.

Overall, Tokayev can influence the broad direction of monetary policy, even if he does not necessarily dictate every single detail. Suleimenov has also aligned public comments with Tokayev's agenda, which is why we believe he would accommodate a recalibration of the NBK's stance if the president demanded one.

Since Tokayev described the base rate as 'the most pressing issue' at present, presidential involvement seems likely, especially if inflationary pressures escalate further. Tokayev would likely have a say in whether the easing cycle should be halted, reversed, or extended, with Suleimenov unlikely to resist his guidance.

Question:

can you tell me which GDP figures you are using (and FX rate) you are using

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Gross external debt increases to USD 89.9bn in 1Q26

Answer:

For the calculation of the two ratios in the article, I use 4Q25 GDP of UZS 545947 (with ave USDUZS of 12029.5) and 1Q26 GDP of UZS 447900 (with ave USDUZS of 12151.1). You can find the data here: http://nsdp.stat.uz/, national accounts first entry, then scroll down to find the exchange rate.

Question:

The EMAE looks to have diverged noticeably from the quarterly INDEC data starting around Q3/Q4 2025 (after years of close correspondence).What is driving this divergence?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: GDP grows above-expected 0.7% q/q and 2.3% y/y in Q1

Answer:

Preliminary data in Argentina tends to be fairly unreliable for two main reasons. First, EMAE coverage is incomplete and some source datasets arrive with a significant lag. Second, the statistical office had to be rebuilt pretty much from scratch in 2016-2017. This means there are methodological refinements and new sources of data added fairly often, leading to larger revisions than in many advanced economies. Also, some statistical procedures, such as seasonal adjustment, have been affected by the relatively short post-reconstruction data series, although this issue should become less significant over time.

It is also worth noting that the EMAE is adjusted retroactively to match with the latest GDP series after every quarterly update. To test whether the EMAE is getting worse as a GDP estimator, it would be necessary to go grab the original EMAE releases and not just the latest one.

Question:

Thank you for this piece, do you have any views on why such a significant GDP growth decline to 3.1% is expected in 2027? Is that a HCP number? What's behind the weakening?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: GDP growth reaches 4.6% y/y, below flash estimate

Answer:

The forecast for a slowdown to 3.1% in 2027 is by the central bank. The main reason is a base effect in agricultural output that is expected to return to average next year after exceptionally high 2026. Here is the abstract from BAM's press release: "Domestically, agricultural value added would increase by 16 percent in 2026, following a rise of 8.2 percent in 2025, reflecting a cereal harvest estimated by the Department of Agriculture at 90 million quintals. It would then contract by 7.6 percent in 2027, assuming a return to average cereal output. Non-agricultural growth would hover around 4.2 percent on average in 2026-2027, after 4.5 percent in 2025. Overall, according to Bank Al-Maghrib's projections, national growth would accelerate from 4.9 percent in 2025 to 5.2 percent in 2026, before slowing to 3.1 percent in 2027, reflecting the base effect."

Question:

How does the FY 2026-27 financing compare to FY 2025-26, taking into account the USD 750mn World Bank DPO approval?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: FinMin presents FY 2026/27 budget statement in parliament

Answer:

Assuming the newly approved USD 750mn World Bank DPO is disbursed immediately and counted in FY2025/26 financing, this would broadly bring FY2025/26 World Bank support in line with budget assumptions, which had USD 780mn under the World Bank DPO line.

Comparing the two fiscal years, FY2026/27 shows lower net external financing overall, declining to around USD 894mn from USD 1.74bn in FY2025/26, largely due to a sharp drop in commercial borrowing.

At the same time, program lending rises from USD 1.01bn to USD 1.48bn, with the World Bank component increasing significantly to USD 1.31bn from USD 780mn. This suggests FY2026/27 assumes higher World Bank financing than FY2025/26. The exact composition is not fully clear, but it may potentially include the newly announced sustainability-linked facility of around USD 500mn, although the timing and the budget classification of that facility are uncertain at this stage.

Net domestic financing rises modestly to USD 7.66bn from USD 7.49bn, indicating slightly greater reliance on domestic borrowing in FY2026/27.

Below is a table showing financing under FY2025/26 Supplementary I (updated financing breakdown is not yet available) and the envisaged mix for FY2026/27, in USD mn (our calculation using an exchange rate of KES 130/USD).

Question:

Given the revised nominal GDP number, what is your best estimate of Senegal's debt-to-GDP ratio for 2025?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Stats office publishes rebased 2023-24 GDP

Answer:

Mechanically, if we assume the 2025 rebasing effect is broadly in line with 2024, i.e. nominal GDP is revised upward by 16-18%, we'd get a rebased 2025 GDP of around XOF 25tn-25.4tn versus the current XOF 21.5tn estimate under the old series, and a total debt/GDP ratio of 110-112% of GDP (vs 130% previously), of which ~99-100% is central administration debt, and the remainder 11-12% is SOE debt + arrears.

That said, this estimate depends on several assumptions (apart from the implied impact of the rebasing). First, the 2024 GDP figure itself is semi-definitive and could still be revised in the ANSD's final release. Second, it assumes the debt stock itself is unchanged - something that is not certain given unknowns around the size of SOE debt and domestic arrears, and the IMF's recent indication that it wants to see a new audit by an international firm, which we think may suggest further scrutiny of debt accumulation specifically over the past two years.

Question:

Your story on Senegal's previous auction stated that total issuance reached 48% of the regional market funding target of XOF 3,912bn, based on the March 2026 macroeconomic update. Following the recently released medium-term program, what would be the updated regional market issuance target and execution?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Govt raises XOF 107bn in T-bills, bonds

Answer:

The released program was fairly light on details regarding the 2026 budget revision.

Based on the limited information provided on the revenue and expenditure adjustments, we estimate that the budget deficit would increase by around XOF 270bn. Assuming there are no other changes to the financing needs or sources, this would imply a revised regional market issuance target of XOF 4,182bn.

On that basis, total issuance of XOF 1,898bn (including the March APE operation) would represent roughly 45% of the revised target.

Question:

How realistic do you view the current math behind keeping a sub-3% budget deficit? And how much of that is flattered by below-the-line financing?

Answer:

It is difficult to say at this point, because the draft budget will be presented in mid-August. Over the last couple of years, the government has overshot its revenue projections, which has led to the need for spending consolidation in Q4. As for how realistic it is, the new administration has hinted several times that it could surpass the 3% threshold temporarily in case of any shocks, the latest one being the recent oil price shock:

We have previously had a query as to what the steps for removing the 3% threshold are here:

https://emergingmarketwatch.com/browser#/article/1267382

Overall, we think the government will aim to stay close to the 3% threshold, especially with the pressure on the rupiah and the capital outflows. If it opts to exceed it temporarily, this would likely increase further the external pressure and create more problems than the benefits from the extra spending would bring, in our view. The recent free meal programme cuts suggest that the government is ready to consolidate on the spending side.

As for below the line spending, we do not think the government has much space to go further than what it currently does. Most of the below-the-line spending now goes through the state sovereign wealth fund Danantara, which has taken over capital investment in key sectors and has started issuing bonds.

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Govt, parliament approve 2027 Macroeconomic Framework