Question:

To what extent are natural gas prices regulated in Czechia? It seems like they are mostly market-based but as it is mentioned in the text the buffer comes from fixed-price clauses in contracts, however, these seem to be an arrangement between supplier and client rather than something imposed by the government.

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Iran conflict is likely to be pro-inflationary, narrow space for rate cuts

Answer:

Natural gas prices are partially regulated in the Czech Republic, to a far lesser extent than electricity prices. Currently, the regulated component of final retail natural gas prices is 25%, as per information from the energy regulator. To put that into context, the regulated component of final electricity prices is currently about 30%, after the removal of the renewable energy surcharge, which was about 15% of the final price. The size of that component depends on several factors, like infrastructure maintenance costs, transmission fees, etc. and is determined once a year by the regulator.

As far as fixed-price clauses in contracts are concerned, they are entirely market-based, and there is no government involvement. As far as households are concerned, these clauses typically last between 1 and 2 years for natural gas contracts, and between 1 and 3 years for electricity contracts. Meanwhile, business contracts are completely market-based.

Having said all that, we expect that if natural gas prices increase significantly, the government will intervene by offering a support scheme, similar to what happened in 2022. This coalition has made maintaining energy prices low as its top priority, so we expect fiscal support to be more generous than it was under the previous government. It will most likely follow a similar pattern, i.e. a price compensation scheme for both households and business, likely depending on consumption level, maybe with some consumption cap. We also expect that the EU will approve yet another suspension of SGP rules if another energy crisis is looming, so the Czech government will have its hands untied. It is where we see the biggest potential risk, as this government is unlikely to apply a fiscal consolidation effort similar to what the previous government did in 2024.

Question:

Could you clarify how the current natural gas pricing mechanism works?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Fuel prices to increase sharply if Druzhba pipeline does not start - Gulyas

Answer:

There is no gas pricing mechanism as such in Hungary. Residential gas prices have been frozen for several years now and their levels have nothing to do with market prices prevalent at one time or another and do not change in case of any change of the theoretical components of the retail price. Residential gas prices are differentiated in two brackets - HUF 100 per c.m. for consumption below the country average in the lower bracket and HUF 767 per c.m. for consumption above the country average. The threshold between the two brackets is 1,729c.m. per year. There is no information regarding what prices would be without any government regulation. The government was forced to introduce the two-bracket price system due to the energy crisis in 2022. From 2013 till 2022, there was only one residential gas tariff, equal to the current price in the lower bracket.

The difference between the regulated and market prices is borne by the state-owned energy company MVM, for which it usually receives subsidies from the government. These subsidies amounted to HUF 600-700bn in 2025, PM Office head Gergely Gulyas said today, although this amount should include other subsidies for residential power and heating services, which are also subject to price regulation.

Question:

Would it be correct to assert that gas prices, as measured in CPI, will not be affected at all by the recent sharp rise in wholesale gas prices in Europe given that the tariff was already set by the URE back in December?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Market turmoil including zloty selloff likely to make MPC much more cautious

Answer:

The direct impact of higher gas prices won't immediately impact CPI inflation. The household natural gas price has two main components: the tariff for the gas itself and the tariff for gas distribution. The former is on hold to end-H1 2026 while the latter was lowered slightly in January. That does mean there should be no immediate impact on household gas prices.

But gas costs for companies are deregulated and so it is still possible that if companies take on much higher prices, you could have a knock-on impact on consumer prices. There could also be a situation where the gas companies motion the regulator to change consumer prices early, though I imagine this would only happen if any price rises are sustainable.

As Gas System, the operator, said recently, the heating season is nearly over. The weather has warmed up a bit after a cold January and February, and gas stocks are about 50%, which is said to be high for this time of year.

In the end, much will depend on how long the shock lasts and that is unclear at this stage.

Question:

Is there a timeline for the vote on the EU's budget headroom to get the EUR 90bn loan approved or will this be delayed until the pipeline is restored?

Answer:

Unfortunately, we do not know if there is any timeline for the EU vote. EU economy commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis said at the end of January that the first disbursement should be made in early April. The EP said the following in a press release from Feb 11: 'The support loan will be financed through common EU borrowing from capital markets and guaranteed by the "headroom" of the EU long-term budget, and debt-servicing costs will be covered by the EU's annual budgets.' https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260206IPR33903/parliament-approves-EU90-billion-ukraine-support-loan-package

We understand Hungary's decision to block the loan after it was agreed by all EU nations including Hungary came as a surprise to both Kyiv and Brussels and is not connected with the Druzhba oil pipeline, no matter what Budapest may be saying. This decision coincided with Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto's visit to Moscow, where he discussed energy.

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Russian pipeline may be restored within one month, says Zelensky

Question:

Hi, do you know if there is a document with the budget execution for 2025? possibly with quarterly data, as the last I can see is for Q1 2025. Thanks

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Budget deficit amounts to 2.1% of GDP in 2025

Answer:

Unfortunately not, they stopped publishing that in the last two years. The latest info is here: https://api.mf.uz/media/budget_activity_files/GGO_statistic_reports_5NGwFt9.pdf

There is also the 2026-2028 budget document, but it is in Uzbek, with annual data and it was issued last year, so would not have the full data for the 2025 budget execution.

Questions:

Thank you for your update, can I ask a couple of questions on polling:

1) What is the track record of presidential polls, and is there room for big surprises like we have seen in other countries over the past year?

2) Do you have a view on pollster methodology?

My understanding is that they are now required to include all areas with >800k inhabitants, which can overrepresent these locations at the national level.

The questions were asked in relation to the following story: Historic Pact Senator Iván Cepeda likely to win presidency - GAD3 poll

Answer:

Since Gustavo Petro won the presidency in the second round, we believe there is room for surprise. Although polls at the time showed Petro as the winner with a "credible" margin (around 3%), the country was the only democracy in Latin America without a left-wing government elected at the polls. After his controversial tenure as mayor of Bogotá and his removal from office, it was considered unlikely in academic circles, high society, and political sectors that Petro would win [surprisingly, Petro won in Bogotá]. That said, we believe the following structural problems of Colombia's electoral landscape were widely underestimated and, in our view, will be even more evident factors in these upcoming elections:

1. Low voter turnout: This is a long-standing structural problem that has worsened in recent years, especially in legislative elections [to be held on Mar 8], and among younger cohorts.
2. Presence of illegal armed groups and dissidents in peripheral and border regions: Violence persists and, as HRW noted [our story here], these groups are the "political" presence in areas where the State is absent, and the armed forces are not present, such as Arauca and Nariño. In other words, they decide whether elections take place and whom local populations should vote for, which materially affects elections, although the degree to which this occurs is difficult to quantify ex ante and, I would argue, even ex post.
3. The protests ahead of the 2022 presidential election, which some commentators have noted were influenced by Petrismo, for example, by financing the "first line" that caused disturbances in Cali and Bogotá, showed a social shift among a population that no longer tolerates a) inequality, b) a right-wing elite that governs the country without acknowledging poverty, and c) demands better income distribution. That narrative, which no previous president had brought forward, was introduced by President Gustavo Petro, attracting not only the most vulnerable groups but also others who do not align with orthodox right-wing administrations that have also been marked by corruption cases (e.g., Mauricio Cárdenas and Alberto Carrasquilla as finance ministers, Karen Abudinen at the Ministry of ICT under the Duque administration). This, in our view, even if not reflected in headlines, is an achievement worth noting in Petro's administration.
4. Preelectoral corruption, reflected in accelerated contracting, gifts, and campaign events supported by executive and/or public resources, is a long-discussed issue in all elections. However, we am not aware of a study that conclusively demonstrates material effects on final results. El Colombiano, for instance, just published a piece highlighting links to preelectoral corruption involving Petrismo.

Therefore, even though AtlasIntel and Polymarket currently show a technical tie in the second round, we do not find it improbable that "the big market surprise," as reflected in last week's sharp corrections in FX and fixed-income markets following the Invamer poll results, of an overwhelming victory for Cepeda could be plausible.

Now, the caveat of these polls compared with local ones, and which allows us to answer your question about the credibility of domestic polls, is that Semana, the leading right-wing outlet that has been openly opposed to Petrismo, commissioned the AtlasIntel survey. Although AtlasIntel is widely respected for its accuracy in recent elections (Argentina, the United States), one cannot rule out that there may be the possibility that there may be a slight intention to avoid showing a decisive Cepeda victory.

As for Polymarket, much of the Colombian population, which is poor and without means, cannot access it, so it ultimately reflects the vision of the "market" or those who can place online bets, meaning its results must also be interpreted with caution. That same "market" was caught off guard last week with Invamer's result.

The new polling law, Law 2494 of 2025, unusual in our view from the outset, seeks greater representativeness not only by population size (municipalities above 800,000 inhabitants) but also through various demographic cross‑sections. It banned polling before Nov 1, 2025, and several major players, such as YanHaas, exited the polling landscape due to high costs and technical challenges.

What we have seen is that local polls show contradictions, and the latest GAD infographic, in our view, illustrates this [please see slide 26, here]. If 26% of the sample identifies as right-leaning, 13% as center, and 16% as left-leaning, how is an overwhelming victory for Petrismo via Iván Cepeda possible? One could argue that because 71% of respondents, who are the poorest (strata 1 and 2), would vote for Petrismo, the numbers align. But then, why is there no ideological consistency in the results? As noted, this has been a persistent problem in domestic poll results.

Thus, the only polls that have been consistent in demographic cross‑sections have been AtlasIntel/Semana's Jan and Feb 2026 surveys (the latest was released Sat. and we will report it later today or tomorrow), although they have faced strong criticism because they used "random digital recruitment," which violates the probabilistic sampling required under Law 2494 in all large municipalities and proportional regions. Atlas has not specified the exact municipalities surveyed and labeled its results as a poll, when it may instead resemble an "informal survey," which also violates Law 2494, which requires formal polling, not informal soundings. This morning, incidentally, the National Electoral Council announced sanctions for polls that violate the law's requirements, referring to last week's Invamer results, which caused significant controversy.

In conclusion, leaving aside idiosyncratic elements, caveats, and structural problems, we believe predictions will become more accurate as the presidential second round approaches and the political landscape takes shape after the Mar 8 legislative elections and primaries.

But as a Colombian, and also based on my experience as a polling‑station juror, I have seen that elections are decided on the final day and that anything can be possible in this contest, underscoring the high uncertainty that prevails and will continue to prevail. The issue of polling has made everything more complex, and perhaps Law 2494 of 2025 should have been designed and enacted earlier to allow a reasonable adjustment period and avoid the contradictions we now observe.

Note: Cambio magazine also announced it will unveil a new National Consulting Center (Centro Nacional de Consultoría, CNC) survey today, the firm's first this cycle, underscoring the new law's constraints.

Question:

What is the current gas situation in the country?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Energy supply unaffected by Israel gas export suspension - ministry

Answer:

The war in Iran has forced Israel to suspend all gas exports to Egypt via the East Mediterranean pipeline, while Qatar's force majeure on LNG exports sent gas prices soaring. Egypt's government claims that the gas crisis will not hurt the country but given its heavy reliance on gas imports to meet its energy needs, we see risks, including power blackouts, limited supplies to heavy industry, and larger drain on FX reserves. We estimate that the merchandise trade balance recorded a sharp deficit of USD 15bn in 2025, and the 2026 outlook has deteriorated even further.

Israeli gas imports account for around 15-20% of Egypt's consumption, according to data from the JODI database, which means the missing volumes will have to be compensated by additional LNG shipments and the use of more mazut for electricity production. Egypt has secured two major LNG contracts recently - a USD 4bn deal in November to import 80 cargoes from the US, followed by a second agreement early this year with Qatar for 24 cargoes. Analysts estimated that Egypt would need at least another 60 cargoes in 2026, as gas consumption has been steadily increasing in recent years despite falling production levels. However, the Qatari LNG cargoes are currently suspended, which we think Egypt is trying to compensate with additional mazut imports. However, there is a limit to the amount of mazut that could feed the power plants, which means that Egypt may start experiencing gas and power shortages in the coming weeks. Should the war drag on, however, supply chain disruptions would begin to surface, prompting Egypt to turn to spot markets to make up for any shortfalls in LNG supplies and secure its crude oil needs, at a significantly higher cost.

Egypt's domestic gas production peaked in 2021 and has been falling since then due to lack of investments, maturing fields, and production challenges. Following renewed government efforts to boost investments and production in 2025, it was believed that gas output will rebound in 2026. According to some estimates, LNG imports are currently three times more expensive than the Israel gas that was secured under a USD 35bn deal signed last year, and some estimates show that gas imports will increase by about USD 350mn a month.

Question:

Have there been any news of mass tourist cancellations in Egypt for the upcoming season due to the Iran war?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Press Mood of the Day

Answer:

There haven't been any such reports and commercial aviation remains available in the country.

There was a lot of confusion and frustration following the US State Department advisory on Monday that urged US citizens to leave much of the Middle East, including Egypt. Egypt's Foreign Ministry issued a comment on Wednesday stressing the country remains stable and safe, which should have provided at least some support.

Question:

Do you have the BoP data by quarter or at worst, imports split by energy imports / non energy imports for 5 most recent quarters?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Current Account deficit narrows by 45% y/y to USD 3.2bn in Q3 2025

Answer:

Yes, we have the BoP data by quarters - kindly find attached the BoP spreadsheet. We cover the oil merchandise trade balance as well, but the latest available data is for Q2 2025. Still, you can see the breakdown of the petroleum imports and exports there.

Question:

What maturing debt is due in 2026, and what is the probability of a default? What is the latest updated on the IMF program?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Budget execution data

Answer:

According to the latest (Q3 2025) Debt Statistics Bulletin from the debt directorate, 12.9% of the country's total outstanding debt is due within a year (covering Oct 1 2025 to Sep 30 2026). The total debt stock as of Q3 was XAF 8,211.7bn, meaning that roughly XAF 1,059bn is due within a year. This can be found in the table on the last page of the document (attached). The values are for the indicator "Dette arrivant en maturité dans un an (% du total)" (Debt maturing within one year). The report also says 54.4% of Gabon's debt is long-term (5 to 20+ years), meaning nearly half of the total debt stock is due in the near-to-medium term. The reports can be found here: https://www.dette.ga/publications/bulletin_statistique/2025

The risk of a default in 2026 remains fairly high but manageable if external support is secured. Regarding the IMF program, a staff mission will conclude a 10-day visit to Libreville today but there is no news yet on a formal request for a financing program. However, last week's minutes from the Cabinet meeting showed the president wants the finance minister to finalise a program by May 2026.

Question:

Where can I find information on the execution of the government budget? What is the latest information available?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Finance minister addresses 2026 budget, tax measures, IMF program

Answer:

Gabon doesn't release this type of information unfortunately. The finance ministry hasn't published a budget execution report since 2018. The Court of Accounts is also responsible for monitoring the budget but it hasn't published a finance law report since 2022. You can find the available reports here.

Towards the end of last year, media articles mentioned a 2024 report from the Court of Accounts report but journalists seemed to have their own hard copies because it's not online; we covered that here.

Question:

Do you have an assessment of the impact of the current oil price increase on Pakistan's oil import costs and on inflation? Also, on the trade/current account balance and international reserves?

Answer:

We can refer you to this working paper by SBP economists Naafey Sardar and Zulfiqar Hyder.

https://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/wpapers/2022/wp110.pdf

They estimate that one standard deviation (8.7%) monthly change in global oil prices leads to 1.33pp change in CPI inflation in one year, with the effect more pronounced in the case of a demand shock compared to a supply shock. At present, I would tend to think we have a combination of both, with demand probably spiking to build up reserves in expectations for the drop in supply. Their model also shows that the SBP is likely to hike the key rate in case of a protracted supply shock or a demand shock with second-round effects on inflation. This would mark a change in the current neutral stance after the series of rate cuts last year.

One important thing to note is that the pass-through effect of global oil price changes is higher during times of IMF programmes, as the government is less flexible to use fiscal policy to offset those. Just to note that fuel prices are regulated, and the government sets the fuel levy and sales tax components. Hence, the IMF is less likely to allow the government to cut the fuel levy and sales tax, as it would lead to lower revenues and deterioration of the fiscal deficit.

As for the impact on the other components, it would be easier to estimate as oil-related imports account for about 29-30% of Pakistan's import bill. Here's a link to our latest trade deficit analysis, where you can see imports are up 9.5% y/y in Jul-Jan FY26 even before the oil price increase, hence their growth will go well into the double-digit area if the high oil prices persist. In terms of numbers, I would speculate that we can expect import growth to accelerate to 12-15% y/y in FY26 if oil prices remain elevated by June, while the merchandise trade deficit could expand by 34-36%, given it is already up by 28% y/y in Jul-Jan FY26.

https://emergingmarketwatch.com/browser#/article/1355559

The impact on the current account deficit will be more muted as remittances from Pakistanis abroad have been growing robustly, up by 11.3% y/y in Jul-Jan FY26, so they will likely offset part of the trade deficit expansion due to the oil price increases.

https://emergingmarketwatch.com/browser#/article/1355541

As for reserves, Pakistan has been accumulating reserves steadily since Aug 2025, primarily on the back of the IMF disbursements as well as SBP's net purchases on the forex market. The higher import bill will likely slow the reserve accumulation, though it heavily depends on IMF disbursements and external debt servicing. At present, the central bank is likely more concerned with external debt servicing rather than the trade deficit's impact on reserves. There is a USD 1bn maturing Eurobond in April, as well as another USD 700mn in interest payments. The government is also negotiating with the UAE for the rollover of a USD 2bn deposit. The total external debt servicing bill for FY26 (Jul 2025 - Jun 2026) stands at USD 23bn, with a large part of those already rolled over or refinanced.

The question was asked in relation to the following story: