Question:

Is there a time series of this? How does it overlap with the official series for new house prices?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: New housing offer prices in Prague rise by 8.7% y/y in Q3

Answer:

There is a time series, but Deloitte changed their collecting methodology and timing in 2025, so quarterly data has been available on a regular basis only since the beginning of 2025. You can find the archive with all past data, the publication is also available in English:

https://www.deloitte.com/cz-sk/en/Industries/real-estate/research/develop-index-archive.html

Regarding the second part of your question, we cannot provide a comparison of absolute prices, as all other series we have consist of indices. Price dynamics tends to be broadly similar, but the Deloitte sample differs from that of the statistical office, the Czech Bank Association, or CSOB, which are the other series we follow.

Question:

I was wondering if you had any updated information on the gas hedging operations of Hungary's MVM, and whether higher spot gas prices have any practical implication for the budget?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Gas trading hedging strategy of state-owned energy group MVM

Answer:

No, we do not have new details on MVM's hedging strategy. MVM does not seem to make such information public, apart from broad references to using hedging instruments to mitigate financial risks related to different pricing mechanisms between sourcing and sales. We believe that any such hedges cannot completely offset the rise in global energy prices, but MVM probably feels the higher cost with a delay compared to spot prices. More insight into the pass-through process into MVM's cost structure seems unavailable, but the government did say outright that the budget will incur HUF 232bn of higher expenses in 2027 because of the increased global energy prices.

Question:

Is it possible to compare fiscal costs of housing programme to the previous programme? And is it possible to be clearer on the differences re eligibility between the third pillar and the old programme?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: New housing loan programme to start from Oct 28

Answer:

The 2026 budget plans with HUF 654.4bn of housing subsidies, while the proposed 2027 budget allocates only HUF 310.2bn. An important reason for the sharp drop is that the Tisza government decided to discontinue the HUF 1mn housing subsidy to civil servants, as part of its overhaul of the housing subsidy policy. This item alone should cut HUF 225bn from the housing subsidy expenses of the budget. Excluding this item, the planned housing subsidies in 2027 are still HUF 119.2bn lower than in 2026. Based on this, the new programme should have lower cost overall, but data for a more direct comparison are not available.

The eligibility differences include a new condition for 45 years limit in the new programme, compared to no age restrictions in the old programme. Under the new programme, spouses have to apply jointly and both have to meet the eligibility conditions, while the old programme allowed individual applications. The differences between the two programmes also include more minor terms regarding previous property ownership and side cases like property acquired under usufruct rights and so on, with the new programme generally offering a more stringent interpretation of these rules. The old programme could be also combined with other housing subsidies for families (the so-called CSOK Plus), while the new programme allows for applying and benefiting from only one housing subsidy at a time.

Question:

Who bears the brunt of the cost for higher oil/natural gas prices in Hungary? Is it the government or MOL (or both)?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Oil and gas group MOL restarts fire-damaged refinery unit

Answer:

The government bears a cost from the high energy prices, since it subsidises state-owned energy group MVM for charging below-market prices of electricity and gas for retail consumers. Another cost to the government comes from the recently approved subsidy on diesel prices for farmers, households and hauliers, as well as the recently proposed six-month delay in implementing the automatic excise tax hike on fuels from Jan 1, 2027 to Jul 1, 2027. There are media speculation that MOL has unofficially agreed to keep retail fuel prices low, but this is just speculation that cannot be verified. Otherwise, MOL does not carry any burden from the high oil prices, but it does pay a special tax based on the spread between Ural and Brent oil prices.

Question:

If the NBP board appointments go through as rumoured, would the replacements be given a full term or just take over the term of the person they are replacing?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: MPC seems likely to hold in Nov on fuel tax cuts, but outlook darkens

Answer:

The new NBP Management Board replacements would be for full six-year terms. Two would take over for the two terms that expired in March, one will become a board member when the Nov 4 term expires, and the final one when the Jan 1 term expires. I haven't seen a breakdown of which candidate is to replace which term, but reports say Marta Kightley will take her term (which expired in March and which will mean she is again first deputy governor) and MPC member Ludwik Kotecki will take over the other term that expired in March. MPC member Przemyslaw Litwiniuk will take the term to expire on Nov 4 (and likely be the second deputy governor), and MPC member Marcin Zarzecki will take the Jan 1 term.

To note, the MPC members will need new terms as well, and they will get full six-year terms. This is all in line with a Constitutional Tribunal ruling that said the terms are not collective, but individual.

Question:

I was wondering if you could help me with getting information on some of the TUIK import/export series that are no longer published. TUIK stopped providing detailed trade data on country origin/destination of imports/exports, SITC 4, BEC and ISIC Rev 4 monthly data. As a result I no longer know where to find the import data in USD terms for oil and gas or the data on confidential products (a proxy for gas imported from Russia). The CBRT database does not appear to provide data for this (or there are gaps due to the classification method chosen to be reported). Do you know where to get this more complete trade data?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Real exports dip slightly y/y, while real imports fall again in August

Answer:

You can access the general trade system data through this link and the special trade system data here. Once you have logged in, please select the filters that best suit your needs.

Question:

Which foreign banks have expressed interest in entering Georgia? Is Barclays one of them?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Georgia plans to simplify licensing for reputable international banks

Answer:

I have not seen any particular bank tied to this specific piece of news, including in the more detailed rendition of the issue described, for example, in the main business daily in Georgia: https://bm.ge/news/seb-i-maghali-reputatsiis-saertashoriso-bankebis-shvilobilebze-litsenziebs-gamartivebulad-gastsems-kanonproeqti

Barclays has recently held meetings with senior government officials (https://bm.ge/en/news/lasha-khutsishvili-met-with-igor-akulov-managing-director-of-barclays-investment-bank), and explicitly said that it sees Georgia as attractive for international investment (https://www.gbc.ge/public/en/news/finanse/barclays-sees-georgian-market-as-attractive-for-international-investment), but, again, I can't claim an officially expressed interest in entering Georgia.

Question:

Why are inflows in Kazakhstan's financial account represented with a minus sign?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: CA balance posts USD 780.8mn surplus in Q3 - preliminary

Answer:
The NBK has adopted the IMF's BPM6 as its BoP methodology. As per the BPM6, the financial account net balance has the opposite sign compared to BPM5, i.e., net inflows are represented with a minus sign.

Question:

Where can I find the draft resolution by NBK to restrict short-term note access?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: NBK plans to restrict non-residents' access to short-term notes

Answer:

The draft resolution can be downloaded here.

Question:

Can you share an updated file containing relevant FX flows?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: NBK buys USD 910mn from sovereign fund to sell domestically

Answer:

The most recent data can be found here.

Question:

hi could you pls tell me the timetable for approving the 2027 budget - thanks, Simon

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Central govt primary balance swings to above-expected BRL 4.8bn surplus in Sep

Answer:

Constitutionally, Congress must approve the budget by Dec 22, 2026, the deadline marking the end of the legislative year. Analysis of the budget bill is set to begin this month, and, if the legislative schedule holds, the 2027 budget should be put to a plenary vote on Dec 17, 2026.

However, there have been several instances in which Congress failed to review the bill by the constitutional deadline, as happened in 2025, when budget approval was postponed until the following year. In such cases, until the budget is approved, the government operates under a provisional spending arrangement, with monthly allocations limited to 1/12 of the proposed budget.

The government still needs to adjust the 2027 budget to incorporate all the measures announced during the election campaign while maintaining the fiscal target of a primary surplus of 0.5% of GDP. This process could require additional time for Congress to review and vote on the bill. However, we do not expect Congress to postpone approval until next year, particularly as the government will push for the bill to pass before a more right-leaning Congress takes office in 2027.

Question:

Has this call changed after this morning's focus survey?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Market reaction to Lula's reelection unlikely to stop 25-bp Selic cut in Nov

Answer:

Yes, we have changed our baseline scenario for the Copom's next decision to a Selic hold after this week's Focus Report, though we have not fully ruled out one last 25-bp cut before a pause.

We expect the Copom to hold the Selic rate at 13.75% at its November 3-4 meeting amid the deterioration in inflation expectations following President Lula da Silva's reelection. The absence of clear signals from Lula regarding his fiscal plans, particularly ahead of adjustments to the 2027 budget, has reinforced uncertainty over the government's commitment to fiscal adjustment. These concerns are reflected in the latest Focus Report, which shows inflation expectations remaining above the 4.50% upper limit of the target range in 2027 and rising to 3.98% for 2029, indicating a slower convergence toward the 3.00% central target.

The balance of inflation risks has consequently shifted further to the upside, strengthening the case for a pause. In addition to the risk of a more persistent depreciation of the BRL and further de-anchoring of inflation expectations, fiscal measures supporting consumption could add to demand-side pressures.

Nevertheless, we do not entirely rule out one final 25-bp cut to 13.50%, as signs of slowing economic activity, weaker-than-expected October IPCA-15 inflation, and decelerating credit growth suggest that restrictive monetary policy is weighing on domestic demand. The still-wide interest-rate differential with the US could also provide some room for further easing. We recall that this week's Focus Report indicates that analysts continue to expect a 25-bp cut in November.

Overall, we believe the balance of risks favors a pause, although the decision remains finely balanced. One thing to notice is that a pause could give the Copom the time to assess if the changes are a shock or a new trend. We expect the Copom to adopt a more hawkish tone, emphasizing the deterioration in the inflation outlook, while avoiding forward guidance amid continued fiscal uncertainty.

We will present a more detailed report on this later today through our CBW.

Questions:

1. Could you provide a more detailed breakdown of the external financing plan?
2. How much is multilateral (and how much of this is IMF EFF vs. potential RSF), bilateral, and external issuance?
3. The 2027 budget proposal appears to mark a significant deterioration relative to the end-2026 EFF QPC for the PGE+CFDD overall budget floor (USD 3.140bn, about 2.2% of GDP, based on the IMF's April nominal GDP estimate). Can you comment on this?

The questions were asked in relation to the following story: Govt unveils 2027 budget for USD 50.2bn; central govt deficit to be 3.1% of GDP

Answer:

(1) Could you provide a more detailed breakdown of the external financing plan?

Yes, but with a caveat. The pro forma suggests external financing of around USD 7.7bn, but the accompanying borrowing plan suggests a lower figure, about USD 5.9bn, with a breakdown of programmed financing by creditor. We cannot tell, from publicly available information, whether the latter is a Sep 30 version (when the codified budget was published) or an unreconciled version. The breakdown in the Annual Borrowing Plan is:

(2) How much is multilateral (and how much of this is IMF EFF vs. potential RSF), bilateral, and external issuance?

All external financing is outlined above. That being said, the total does not match the budget pro forma's figure, as noted. Regarding the RSF, we understand there is not an official RSF for Ecuador yet. We recall the government was negotiating this program with the Fund back in July 2026. Regardless, the PGE does not reference the RSF at all.

(3) The 2027 budget proposal appears to mark a significant deterioration relative to the end-2026 EFF QPC for the PGE+CFDD overall budget floor (USD 3.140bn, about 2.2% of GDP, based on the IMF's April nominal GDP estimate). Can you comment on this?

Yes, because the PGE + CFDD balance for 2027, under the fifth review, was forecast at -0.9% of GDP. Given that the 2027 budget is PGE-only (i.e., the central government budget, mostly excluding the rest of the public sector) and expects a 3.1% deficit (USD 4.4bn), this is indeed a fairly significant deterioration, and, all else equal, consolidating the CFDD (i.e., the oil derivatives financing account balance) would only widen the figure. The PGE does not mention the CFDD balance.

Question:

In Q2, data seemed to suggest that export growth was driven primarily by a big increase in re-exports. Do you have any insight on whether this was true or overstated? Are we still seeing this, and if so do you have any idea what's driving it?

Answer:

The trade data indicates that re-exports have largely contributed to the increase of the kingdom's total exports in Q2 of this year. Notably, re-exports increased by around JOD 366mn y/y, compared with a JOD 233mn rise in domestic exports, accounting for about 61% of the overall increase. However, domestic exports still made up the larger share of total exports. Furthermore, the breakdown points that the increase in re-exports came mainly on the back of precious stones, precious metals and related products, including jewellery, as well as aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof. These two categories accounted for most of the growth during the quarter. Re-exports continued to increase y/y in July and August, although growth was more moderate than in Q2.

Overall, large individual transactions, higher transaction values or changes in regional trade flows could be among the reasons behind the rise in these categories. We note that the increase in aircraft-related re-exports may also have been supported by Jordan's longstanding aviation ties with the US, including Royal Jordanian's aircraft procurement and maintenance agreements with Boeing.

Question:

May I ask what the numbers are for oil revenues in 2025, 2026 budget, 2026 latest and 2027 budget ?

Answer:

Here is a table with the information I've managed to find in the finmin files:

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Govt raises social spending and projects budget deficit at 4.1% of GDP in 2027

Question:

Can I ask what the AOA 6.7tn 2027 budget deficit figure was in the 2026 budget and the latest 2026 fiscal projection ?

Answer:

I checked the Annex 2 of the earlier Fiscal Strategy 2026-2031 against the 2027 figures in the latest Fiscal Strategy and OGE.

The difference is quite significant. The earlier strategy projected a 2027 fiscal deficit of AOA 2.67tn, equivalent to 1.72% of GDP. The latest strategy raises this to AOA 6.74tn, or 4.11% of GDP.

The revision reflects substantially higher projected operational expenditure, while revenue is slightly lower and investment spending remains broadly unchanged. As a result, the primary surplus is also reduced.

I have included a comparison table below to make the differences easier to follow. The revision also points to a significantly slower fiscal consolidation path. The previous strategy envisaged a return to an overall budget surplus as early as 2028, whereas the latest document projects continued deficits throughout the forecast horizon, up to 2032.

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Govt raises social spending and projects budget deficit at 4.1% of GDP in 2027

Question:

Hi - you report revenues of AOA 21,854bn and expenditure of AOA 22,387bn. Where do you arrive at the headline deficit of AOA 6,744bn?

Answer:

The difference is that the deficit calculation also includes net investment in non-financial assets of AOA 6,211bn, which is not captured in the AOA 22,388bn expenditure figure quoted above.
Under Table 19 of the OGE 2027 Budget Justification Report which I use as a source for the story, total expenditure including this investment comes to AOA 28,599bn. Deducting revenue of AOA 21,855bn gives the headline deficit of AOA 6,744bn. This is consistent with the IMF's Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM 2014) methodology, which includes net investment in non-financial assets in the calculation of the fiscal balance. Unfortunately, Table 19 is also quite difficult to read, with some of the column headings and figures poorly aligned.

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Gross financing needs edge up to AOA 15.48tn in 2027

Question:

When will Atiku's appeal process run its course by?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Court ruling invalidates Atiku's ADC candidacy ahead of 2027 elections

Answer:

Appeals in pre-election matters have to be filed within 14 days of the ruling, according to Nigeria's Constitution. So that would be by Nov 19 in this case. There doesn't seem to be any set legal deadline for when matters must be resolved before an election begins, but the Constitution requires that the court fully hear the appeal and deliver its final judgment within 60 days of the appeal's filing. If the ADC files on Nov 19 then the court would have until Jan 18. However, the election is on Jan 16.

If the court doesn't deliver the judgement by election day, Atiku's nomination stays nullified. The ADC will likely file the appeal in the coming days though, which would mean the final judgement must be delivered before Jan 16. In the meantime, the ADC says it intends to seek a stay of execution and will take the matter to the Supreme Court if the process with the Court of Appeal fails.

Question:

Can you please advise what are the best sources/polls to track the coming elections? And what are the common base case vs risk cases?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Government approval rating remains below 50% in September

Answer:

Polling in Nigeria is still relatively limited but there are a few sources. A poll by Oxford-Metro Analytics in September collected 69k responses which placed incumbent Tinubu at 35.4%, Peter Obi at 33.9% and Atiku Abubakar at 26.7% for the 2027 election. This was a voluntary online poll, self-selected without demographic weighting. There's also an aggregation of several surveys that is compiled by NigeriaPolls. The July aggregation covers NigeriaPolls, NOI Polls, SBM Intelligence and Afrobarometer (individual samples of 2,400, 1,800, 1,500 and 2,100 respectively). The voter-intention figures showed Tinubu at 34.3% in the weighted aggregate, Obi 26.5%, Atiku 21.8% and Kwankwaso 8.5% (and 9% undecided). NigeriaPolls says it weights the polls by sample size and recency so it's a useful way of comparing several sources.

The political polls are not published frequently except the monthly govt approval ratings one that we cover. However, starting this month as the elections near we will be publishing special Election Watch reports where we give updates on available polls, campaign developments, negotiations between opposition parties, voter turnout expectations, etc.

Base case: Tinubu victory, fragmented opposition

Tinubu didn't have a strong lead in 2023 but he benefitted from split opposition votes across several candidates. He achieved 36.6% of votes, Atiku Abubakar came in second with 29.1%, Peter Obi had 25.4%. If opposition voters had been able to unite behind one candidate, the results could have looked very different. If again in 2027, Atiku, Obi and others maintain separate bases, Tinubu's APC will likely benefit from the fragmentation again.

As of October, opposition parties say consultations are ongoing in hopes of a possible coalition. A veteran Nigerian politician, senator Ben Obi, has been facilitating discussions since April between Atiku, Peter Obi and Seyi Makinde but months later none of the three seem willing to step aside for another candidate. A summit for opposition parties is scheduled for early Nov therefore there is still a small chance for cooperation. So, opposition unity is the main factor that would impact the base case.

Risks and other issues:

Voter turnout: Nigeria had low participation in the past, which if it continues into 2027 is generally expected to benefit Tinubu due to his incumbent structural advantages. INEC's data puts turnout at roughly 54% in 2011, 44% in 2015, 35% in 2019 and 27% in 2023. With each subsequent election, the turnout is declining. INEC now puts the 2026 register at 103.4mn and if the 2023 turnout ratio is maintained and doesn't decline this will mean under 28mn voters. Turnout intention is high in some surveys (84% likely/very likely to vote in civic non-profit Yiaga's September National Voting Intentions Survey) but this will be much lower in reality.

Young voters and their economic concerns: According to INEC's latest registration data, the share of voters aged 18-49 declined from 75.4% in 2023 to 70.6% in 2026. Nearly 71% is still a substantial share and this cohort will be particularly focused on issues around unemployment, the cost of living, insecurity and government accountability. If voter turnout rises meaningfully, the opposition might be able to capitalise on this current economic frustration. Under the Tinubu government, Nigeria's national poverty rate rose from 56% in 2023 to an estimated 63% by 2025/26 meaning that young voters could be more motivated to vote now than in the past.

Insecurity/violence: In some surveys, participants cite worsening insecurity as both a reason to not go out and vote due to safety concerns, and a reason to demand government accountability through voting. On political violence, the US' International Republican Institute's pre-election assessment for Nigeria points to several election-related attacks in the run-up to the Ekiti and Osun states governorship elections in June and August. If repeated in 2027, this might risk the credibility of the electoral process and INEC may struggle to effectively coordinate in affected areas

Question:

In his 19 October press conference, Ousmane Sonko claimed that energy subsidies would fall to XOF 552bn in 2026, from XOF 790bn previously envisaged, and further to XOF 479bn in 2027.

Is the XOF 552bn 2026 subsidy proposal publicly available?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Sonko threatens to block budgets over austerity measures

Answer:

The XOF 552bn figure was indeed cited by Ousmane Sonko during the press conference as reported by several local media outlets. It is however not traceable in the publicly available budget documents. The revised budget cites an increase in energy subsidies to XOF 790bn, from XOF 250bn in the initial budget. PressAfrik even published a fact-check on 21 October describing Sonko's claim as false. The finance ministry subsequently maintained the XOF 790bn figure in its initial responses to the parliamentary finance committee, according to the committee report as well as news coverage.

Nevertheless, there is some ambiguity over the composition of this amount. In its report, the parliamentary finance committee explicitly requested a breakdown, distinguishing current-year subsidy costs, tariff compensation, arrears and other expenditure, as well as a reconciliation between the overall envelope and the actual budget appropriations. Furthermore, the ministry's subsequent explanations, as cited by the local media, do indicate that some of the funding will be used to settle outstanding obligations, including approximately XOF 320bn owed in relation to Senelec's commercial losses and fuel purchases (excluding claims still under review by the energy regulator). The exact amount however remains unclear.

It is thus possible that Sonko's figure is related to the difference between the current year subsidies vs. subsidy arrears, but we are not sure how exactly he arrived at it. The ministry's latest response to the committee, reportedly a 29-page memorandum dated 29 October, has not been made publicly available as far as we know.

Question:

Would you know how long it takes to get the election results?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Ipsos poll shows DA gains across metros but ANC rebounds in Tshwane

Answer:

I expect that the results should be out by the morning, although the IEC says official results are due within 7 days. Counting begins at the voting station after the close of the voting process. There is a national results centre which will be followed closely by media through the night. Again, the official final results will be announced by the IEC potentially in a couple of days but the first preliminary results should be out by the morning based on the experience from previous elections.

Question:

I have a question regarding the SARB's quarterly bulletin and the Budget if I may. On page 112 of the PDF (https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/quarterly-bulletins/quarterly-bulletin-publications/2026/september/1-full-bulletin.pdf), the chart "Cash book balance of national government" shows the series "Budgeted cumulative balance, 2026 Budget Review". Do you know where to find it please?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Financial account returns to small inflow in Q2 as FDI offsets portfolio flows

Answer:

I have never seen monthly NT cash flow projections. I am pretty sure that these projections are not publicly released, although it is clear that they are available.