Question:

There have been different reports regarding the energy support measures, with respect to the measures outlined in the following paragraph. Is it possible to clarify the measures and provide sources for these. In paragraph at the end of this email, I have seen different media reports suggesting: - Electricity subsidies for business and the calculation of average price has been shortened from 6 months to 1 month. - The fuel excise tax for agricultural producers has been reduced - Toll fees for transport sector has been postponed. "We recall that the recently announced measures included reinstating electricity subsidies for businesses when market electricity prices exceed EUR 122 per MWh. The subsidies for energy-intensive industries will be activated at electricity prices above EUR 63 per MWh. Furthermore, the cabinet has opted to postpone a planned toll fee increase from April to June, double the support for the transport sector to EUR 50 million, and temporarily abolish the fuel excise tax for agricultural producers. A EUR 20 monthly compensation to the poorer citizens with a car and an average monthly gross income of less than EUR 781 was also included."

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Higher fuel prices to bring in EUR 50-60mn more in state budget - FinMin

Answer:

The measures listed were sourced from various media coverage of PM Gyurov's and other government official statements, for instance: https://www.investor.bg/a/515-ikonomika-i-makrodanni/428515-gyurov-pravitelstvoto-vavezhda-merki-za-da-spre-poskapvaneto-za-potrebitelite, https://agri.bg/novini/namaliava-se-akciziet-na-gorivata-za-zemedelskite-proizvoditeli, or https://www.bta.bg/en/news/1097283?download=1#:~:text=The%20reduction%20in%20gas%20oil,disposal%20rather%20than%20for%20sale. Basically, the main and first source was Gyurov's press conference, followed by subsequent clarifying statements of other officials. The government aimed to implement targeted measures and avoid price caps.

Electricity subsidies: The clarification is that back in the 2025, the government at the time significantly tightened the conditions for companies to receive electricity subsidies, ruling that compensations were to be given once for each separate period of six months when the weighted average price for six months in the day ahead segment of the Bulgarian energy exchange exceeded BGN 240 (EUR 122.7mn) per MWh. While the subsidy threshold remains at EUR 122 per MWh (BGN 240 per MWh), companies no longer need to wait for six months of elevated prices. They are now entitled to monthly state compensation covering 50% of the price above this threshold.

Subsidies for energy-intensive industry: A separate assistance scheme for energy-intensive industries was approved. The EC approved this state aid scheme for Bulgaria on Apr 16, under the condition that those companies must reinvest a significant share of the received aid in decarbonisation measures. For Bulgaria, the scheme budget amounts to EUR 334mn for the 2025-2028 period. It will be applied retroactively as of Jul 2025, and will last until Jun 30, 2028. The aid will be distributed through electricity suppliers in the form of a reduction in beneficiaries' monthly electricity bills. The compensation will cover up to 50% of the part of the electricity price above the threshold of EUR 63 per MWh, i.e. the price ceiling is twice lower than the one applied for non-energy intensive sectors.

Agricultural diesel discount: Initially in March, the government talked about abolishing the fuel excise tax for farmers, but seemingly, it changed plans. In April, the government approved a one-off additional discount on the value of the excise tax used in agriculture. Agriculture minister Ivan Hristanov said the reduction in diesel excise duty for farmers was to be set at EUR 0.31 per litre, which should translate into a EUR 27.3mn support to fuel users in the agricultural sector that will be paid for their 2025 activity. He explained that until now, the amount received by farmers was EUR 0.21 per litre. The aid is provided as a direct cash subsidy to farmers and covers diesel used in primary agricultural production. The procedure requires submitting applications to municipal agriculture offices, covering fuel used in the prior year.

Toll fee hike postponement: The postponement of the toll fee hike for the transport sector that was supposed to enter into force as of Apr 1 until Jul 1 was announced by caretaker finance minister Georgi Klisurski. The new tolling model was supposed to include an environmental component based on CO2 emissions for trucks and buses, but was delayed to reduce the burden on the sector and prevent rapid increases in goods' prices.

Transport industry aid: The government also proposed to increase state aid for the transport industry to EUR 50mn, aimed to help the sector tackle rising fuel costs. On Apr 14, the government already allocated EUR 18mn in support to bus transport companies in particular.

Fuel compensations for low-income citizens: The EUR 20mn monthly compensation for citizens with a car, but an income lower than EUR 781, was approved for a total of 210,934 people for March. The compensations will be paid in April if the average monthly fuel prices equal or surpass EUR 1.60 per litre.

Question:

I am wondering if you have a list of the CEE3 (Czech, Hungary, Poland) government measures implemented since the Iran War to help with energy shock, and an estimate of the direct cost in terms of GDP this year?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Energy Ministry announces higher petrol and diesel caps for Tues.

Answer:

PL: The Polish government cut on Mar 31 the VAT on fuel to 8% from the standard 23% and lowered the excise tax on fuel to the EU minimum (which is PLN 0.29 per litre for petrol and PLN 0.28 for diesel). The cost of the move is about PLN 1.7bn per month. In step with these moves, the government sets a retail fuel price maximum that moves daily.

The government has said only that it will remain in place for the first few weeks of May but that much depend on the situation in the Middle East. The government is supposed to release by end-April an idea for a windfall tax on fuel firms that is to ostensibly help pay for the tax cuts.

If the tax cuts remain for the rest of the year, the cost would be around 0.4% of GDP. The annual cost of the tax cuts would be some 0.5% of GDP.

CZ: 100,000 tonnes of oil released from government reserve; profit margins on diesel and gasoline sales capped at CZK 2.50/l; excise tax rate on diesel lowered by CZK 2.35/l to CZK 7.60/l, the EU minimum. The cost of the diesel tax cut is CZK 1bn a month, so if it lasts until the end of the year, it will add up to 0.1% of GDP. More measures are currently in the works (a hard cap on fuel prices, removal of the regulated component of non-fuel energy prices), but nothing specific thus far.

HU: The outgoing government capped the retail fuel prices at HUF 595 per litre for gasoline and HUF 615 per litre for diesel. It released the gasoline and diesel strategic reserve in order to finance the below-market price cap. The export of fuels was banned and the government also reduced the excise tax on fuels. The outgoing government has not provided estimates on the expected cost of the measure, while the election winner Tisza has promised to maintain the capped prices.

Question:

Can you also give some details about frozen EU funds' effects over fiscal budget?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Fiscal outlook for 2026 and announced fiscal measures so far

Answer:

The impact of the frozen EU funds on the budget is not straightforward. The EU funds finance domestic projects with a requirement for national co-financing (usually around 20%). When the EU freezes the funds, the government can choose not to implement the projects that were due to be financed by the EU funds. In this case, the budget might be better off as a direct first-round impact, since the requirement for national co-financing will disappear and free up budget space. The economy will, however, suffer obviously. The other option would be for the government to implement these projects entirely out of its own, national resources, in which case the budget would weaken materially as the suspended EU funds will be transferred one-to-one as budget expenditure.

What we observe in Hungary is a mixture of the two. The EU has suspended around EUR 20bn of cohesion and recovery funds, which have been instrumental in the recent sluggishness of the economy. In addition, the government has been forced to implement major projects out of own financing, including railway and electricity infrastructure financing etc, but the direct cost of these on the budget is difficult to estimate without having a detailed cost breakdown and knowing in advance which projects could have been financed out of EU funds and which not.

Question:

Can you please provide the latest available information on fiscal deficit expectations/projections for 2026? Which measures have been officially announced/floated in the media, and what is their fiscal impact (official or estimates)? Is there any reason to worry that Fidesz would be over-spending in the last month or that YTD fiscal deficit would be a major surprise? Or even that there are some skeleton from the closets from previous years?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Budget deficit expands by 33.9% y/y to HUF 3,420.4bn in Q1

Answer:

The latest deficit target of the outgoing government was 5% of GDP for 2026. The election winner Tisza has not yet indicated its fiscal plans since Tisza leader and PM candidate Peter Magyar said that they were still in an information collection phase. Tisza planned to start revising the current budget immediately after taking office, while Magyar also claimed that outgoing economy minister Marton Nagy had informed them that the 5% target was not achievable without corrective action.

Tisza has not reacted to this alleged information and has still rolled out some of the fiscal easing measures from its pre-election programme. These included some pension and family allowance hikes, and a school grant for needy children, with a total cost of HUF 655-795bn annually. In addition, it announced the personal income tax cuts, which were also part of its pre-election programme. The cost of these cuts has not been estimated yet, while a recent publication in pro-Fidesz daily Vilaggazdasag put the total cost of Tisza's pre-election tax promises, including VAT cuts for healthy foods, firewood and prescription drugs, at HUF 800-1,000bn per year.

Among the already announced measures of pension hikes and personal income tax cuts, it was not clear when they will be implemented, but we believe it is more likely from the beginning of 2027.

Magyar has claimed that Fidesz-related circles were trying to secure illegally obtained assets, which could also mean that Fidesz might also want to use the time to syphon as much from the budget as possible. This could happen by transferring funds to university foundations, allocate resources to investment projects managed by Fidesz-friendly companies etc, but we are actually sceptical it would go this far. That said, we expect that the deficit might remain elevated in April due to the inertia from the previous months and the loss of VAT on oil imports, although maybe not a "major" surprise. Unexpected fiscal burdens are unlikely, in our opinion, although Tisza will almost surely complain about the hard legacy of the Fidesz government. The fiscal situation will be definitely challenged by the permanent revenue losses from Fidesz' pre-election support for households and companies.

Question: To the options that PM Bolojan gave at the end of your article. Could president Dan let PM Bolojan govern with a minority-backed government (and effectively force PSD into opposition) without a parliament vote at all or at least before exhausting options to form a majority?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Bolojan criticise years of money misuse by non performing local administrations

Answer: Bolojan sees the two scenarios because he believes that if the motion of no confidence passes, the opposing side will present a governing strategy and take over, which would push the PNL into opposition. If the motion fails, the remaining ruling parties would continue to govern, but with minority support in the parliament. That is the simple rational logic he is applying.

However, the situation is more complex than Bolojan's reasoning suggests. The PSD and the opposition have repeatedly stated that they have no intention of taking over the government and have no governing strategy prepared.

If the motion of no confidence succeeds (I assign an 80% probability), President Dan must call party consultations to determine whether a parliamentary majority is willing to support a new cabinet with a new prime minister. Each party or alliance will present its proposal. Based on public statements, the remaining ruling parties (PNL, USR, UDMR and the minorities group) will present the same governing programme and the same candidate for prime minister, Ilie Bolojan. The president will then have to assess what the other side proposes before making a decision.

On the opposing side, I see two scenarios:

1. PSD and AUR form an alliance and secure a majority with support from MPs in the smaller nationalist parties. This would be easy numerically, but both parties publicly rule out such an alliance. In this unlikely scenario, the president would be constitutionally required to accept their PM proposal, something he has already said he would not do, which would trigger a constitutional crisis.
2. No majority can be formed in the opposing side, so President Dan appoints a PM proposed by the remaining ruling coalition, with minority support. In this case, the president would either have to accept Bolojan again (unlikely, because a Constitutional Court ruling prevents a dismissed PM from being reappointed) or negotiate a different candidate proposed by the minority-backed coalition. A new PM from the remaining ruling parties is very likely to be approved by the parliament, because rejecting the proposal would push the country towards snap elections, a scenario only the nationalists want, and one that lacks majority support.

Therefore, the two most likely outcomes are:

• a minority cabinet formed by the remaining ruling parties, continuing the reform agenda (with or without Bolojan as prime minister), or
• a government formed by PSD together with the nationalists (scenario forced by the Constitution in case they make an alliance).

Question: An article I read (https://www.romaniajournal.ro/politics/romanian-no-confidence-math-233-needed-to-topple-gov/) says this: To successfully dismiss the government, a majority of 233 votes is required out of a total of 463 members of Parliament. At present, PSD and AUR together control 219 votes-129 from PSD and 90 from AUR-meaning they are 14 votes short of the threshold. However, if they secure support from other opposition parties such as S.O.S. Romania, POT, and PACE Romania First, they could add another 41 votes, bringing their potential total to around 260 MPs. In addition, 22 non-affiliated MPs who left POT and S.O.S. could also influence the outcome. On the other side, PNL, USR, and UDMR-parties that have declared support for Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan-hold only 164 parliamentary seats combined, well below the 233 needed for a majority. They are joined by 17 deputies representing national minorities, bringing the pro-government total to 181 votes, still insufficient to guarantee survival in Parliament. Is this right?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: President Dan dismisses PSD-AUR ruling, reaffirms Romania's pro EU path

Answer: Yes, to dismiss the cabinet, a majority of 233 MPs is required, out of a total of 464. The PSD and AUR together hold 220 MPs, but 1 MP defected from the PSD, so they need 14 additional votes from smaller opposition parties or from non‑affiliated MPs. The governing parties have only 181 MPs.

However, there are 20 non‑affiliated MPs, not 22. MPs frequently move between parliamentary groups or choose to become non‑affiliated, which is likely why the article you saw used an outdated figure.

You can find the updated number of MPs in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate here. It is also included at the end of our article, available here.

Question:

Where can I find data on corporate FX deposits?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Credit growth eases to 18.7% y/y in February

Answer:

The central bank publishes the relevant data. It can be found here.

Question:

Do you have a link to the portal where dollar transactions are typically reported?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: COP swings as Finance Ministry buys USD 150-200mn, report says

Answer:

Yes, and shortly after publishing the story, it was added within the text as a link. You can access it here.

Question:

Are the individuals stripped of citizenship dual citizens? If not, what then happens to them?

Answer:

Most of the 69 individuals are not dual citizens, meaning the revocation of their citizenship effectively leaves them stateless. Since many are of non-Bahraini origin, primarily from the Ajami community, they lose access to all state services, including healthcare, education, and banking, while their residency becomes illegal. This status often extends to their families, creating a cycle of legal invisibility and leaving them vulnerable to forced deportation or indefinite detention. The development also comes against a backdrop in which individuals from the Ajami community have at times faced heightened scrutiny by Bahraini security services during periods of regional tensions involving Iran, as authorities step up monitoring of groups perceived as having potential external affiliations or concerns over political alignment in times of crisis.

Question:

Do you have any context on to why Arab foreign investors had significantly strong inflows into the treasury market in April when compared to non-Arab foreign investors?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Foreign funds sell USD 2.1bn worth of bonds/T-bills on EGX in March (net)

Answer:

Based on data from the Egyptian stock exchange (secondary trading), non-Arab investors are still the dominant buyer of T-bills/bonds so far in April. I guess your question is why the foreign Arab funds were net buyers in March, when the non-Arab funds sold USD 4.5bn worth of T-bills and bonds? We think it is mostly because they are more familiar with the MENA region. They have followed more closely how Egypt navigated the global shocks and sell‑offs that marked 2025, so they are less sensitive to capital flight than Western investors, and should be more familiar with the FX risk in Egypt (which is significantly lower now than it was just two years ago).

So, we think it all comes down to the fact that the Arab funds are familiar with the market and thought that Egypt's high nominal and real interest rates are worth the risk.

Question:

Thanks for putting together the table on opinion polls. Would you please be able to share this in an excel format every week? This will allow us to track the polls over the months leading up to the election.

Answer:

Thanks for the feedback! I will consult with the IT team if this is possible. I keep records in an excel file anyway and can send it to you if you are interested.

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Bennett, Yair Lapid to run together in next general elections

Question:

Could you share the source of the news and could you also point out where the government fiscal/budget execution and debt stocks are published?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Govt raises minimum wages by up to 9.8%, excludes public sector

Answer:

You can view the original local media report here:

Regarding your query on budget execution and fiscal data, unfortunately govt does not provide up to date data on this either through the Finance ministry's website of other govt agencies. Rather, most of this information is made available to local media outlets through media briefs or citations from senior govt officials when they give updates. From time to time, the Finance ministry and the Central bank do publish reports (e.g. quarterly reports) which contain such data but in most instances it would be significantly lagged data but several months or quarters. So we mostly look out for latest developments whenever they are published by local media.

The latest March 2026 flash debt bulletin put end-2025 total public debt at USD 17.138bn, with external debt still 56.3% of the total (you can download the report via the link above).

Question:

Can you provide a list of debt repayments, broken down by domestic and external, for FY26 and FY27?

Answer:

The government's external debt repayments are estimated at USD 18.56bn in FY26, according to a Finance Ministry document. This includes USD 9bn in bilateral deposits from Saudi Arabia and China, USD 4.04bn in commercial loans, USD 3.73bn in multilateral and bilateral debt, and USD 1.8bn in Eurobonds. The bulk of the commercial debt, USD 2.2bn, is owed to Chinese banks and is expected to be refinanced. The bilateral deposits are also expected to be rolled over.

However, the total excludes the State Bank of Pakistan's repayment of USD 3.0bn in deposit liabilities to the UAE. In addition, the government repaid USD 450mn to the Gulf nation on account of a legacy loan reportedly contracted in 1996, which was not part of the original FY26 repayment schedule.

Thus, general government external debt repayments are projected to reach around USD 22.0bn in FY26. This is broadly in line with the estimate provided by SBP Governor Jameel Ahmad in July 2025, at the start of the fiscal year, when he projected total external debt servicing at USD 26bn, comprising USD 22bn in principal and USD 4bn in interest payments. The interest component was later revised down to USD 3.7bn amid easing global financial conditions.

Meanwhile, domestic debt maturities are estimated at PKR 14.5tn in FY26, including PKR 8.8tn in T-bills, PKR 2.8tn in floating-rate Pakistan Investment Bonds (PIBs), PKR 1.5tn in fixed-rate PIBs, and PKR 1.4tn in Sukuk.

The government has yet to release detailed repayment projections for FY27. However, a Finance Ministry document indicates that domestic debt redemptions could decline sharply to below PKR 4tn in the next fiscal year. Similarly, external debt repayments are projected at around USD 10bn, which we believe excludes bilateral deposit rollovers. Further clarity is expected in the weeks following the June budget announcement.

Question:

How has the traction been on the RIA scheme in Korea and what's the best way to track this data?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Press Mood of the Day

Answer:

The Korea Financial Investment Association (KOFIA) is the primary official source for RIA data. It aggregates data from many securities firms and releases periodic updates, usually through local business media outlets such as the Chosun Ilbo. There was also an earlier update, at the very start of April.

According to the last update, from last week, by April 21 the programme surpassed KRW 1.0tn (USD 690mn) in cumulative balances with about 160,000 accounts opened, up from the initial KRW 51.9bn on the first day (March 23).

This is strong growth, but put in context actual account inflows are still limited, as total overseas listed investments by Korean investors stood at USD 131.7bn as of April 22.