Question:

What do you expect the impact on June inflation of margin cap, will we have a major downside?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Margin cap on foods brings 19.7% reduction in prices

Answer:

The NBH's latest estimates on the impact of the margin cap showed limited expected contribution to disinflation - some 0.5pps from the food product cap and only 0.1pps from the non-food product cap. We therefore consider it unlikely that the margin price cap could provide significant downside potential to the June CPI print. Besides, the May data showed some negative surprise in food inflation despite the margin cap and we expect that the negative surprise could persist in June, taking into account unfavourable signals regarding food producer prices domestically and abroad.

Question:

What is the planned path for Hungary's deficit (primary and overall) over the medium term? How much will be defence spending vs non-defence? What does this imply for the debt path?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Government prepares for additional spending in 2026 under EU's escape clause

Answer:

The most up-to-date mid-term fiscal outlook is published in the documentation of the 2026 budget. We attach a table with the respective data to the extent that is available.

Question:

Have you seen anything on how long it will last for? Do they promise the full duration of the mortgage?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: New preferential housing loan programme to be part of affordable housing policy

Answer:

Yes, Gulyas explicitly said that the 3% rate will be for the full duration of the loan, which could be a maximum of 25 years. He presented calculations that in case of borrowing the maximum HUF 50mn loan for the maximum 25 year duration, the state interest subsidy will amount to HUF 15-20mn for the duration.

Question:

When are elections in Hungary? Do you have any more details when you'd expect them in Apr 2026?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Pro-government pollster Nezopont measures 5pps lead of Fidesz in June

Answer:

The parliamentary elections are due in Apr 2026. There is no visibility on the exact date yet. The President has the authority to set the election date, which should be either in April or in May. The announcement of the election date should be 70 to 90 days before the selected election date. This means that President Tamas Sulyok could be expected to make the announcement of the election date in Jan-Feb 2026.

Question:

Can I ask you about the expectation of a EUR 20bn EU fund inflow this year. How is that split between regular and RRF? Is this a net figure or gross inflow figure? I saw that the Council of the European Union approves the assessment of the modified recovery and resilience plan of Poland -- does that imply an inflow of EUR 7.3bn payment request?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Poland is net EUR 9mn payer with EU in May

Answer:

The EUR 20bn is still mostly regular EU funds, but one must remember here that in the EU flow data the FinMin considers the regular EU funds and only the grant part of the RRF. Thus, in 2024, the FinMin put the regular EU fund flow at EUR 10.1bn and the RRF grant part at EUR 7.3bn (though interestingly EC statements put this total in 2024 at a lower EUR 6.8bn). However, Poland also received EUR 8.9bn in RRF grants in 2024. The total RRF flow, as reported by the EC, was EUR 16.2bn. That would mean the regular EU flow plus all RRF flows was EUR 26.3bn in 2024.

For 2025, regular EU funds from the EUR 2021-27 budget should be flowing more quickly and so one imagines the total will be more like EUR 15bn-16bn (though it is hard to say and depends on which programs are ready to be financed or reimbursed). The RRF flow, however, is unsure. The Fund and Regional Development Ministry says PLN 26.3bn will flow in September (that's about EUR 6.2bn), according to this recent statement. I don't actually know the breakdown of this as I can't find a statement on it from the EC despite the motion being submitted by the Polish side in late December. One reason for this is that the Polish side has been revising the so-called RRF plan and that has delayed the EC review, though one would imagine it will come quickly. The ministry will submit two further applications later in 2025, but I'm not sure if they will flow this year or next. I haven't seen an estimate of the values here.

So, for total EU inflows in 2025, one should add the EUR 15bn-16bn plus, say, EUR 2.5bn for RRF grants and another EUR 3.7bn in RRF loans. The flow of regular EU funds plus grants would be EUR 17.5bn-18.5bn and the total flow of regular EU funds plus all RRF funds would be some EUR 21.2bn-22.2bn. There would then be a chance of a higher flow if the two applications to be submitted are ready for a flow by December. Poland has received RRF money in both of the last two Decembers.

There are gross figures.

As for the approval of the updated RRF plan, that does not mark approval of the flow to come in September and so the EC will still have to give this approval, as far as I understand.

Question:

Are these tables on financing needs and sources also available for 2025?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Govt's amended 2024 state budget sees income down a sharp PLN 56bn

Answer:

The tables can be found here: https://emergingmarketwatch.com/browser#/article/1279272. These were part of the budget bill, but I just checked the final versions and there were no changes from the ones published here.

Question: So the net fiscal impact is higher vs what was estimated in the previous article?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Finance ministry publishes draft bill with fiscal measures for public debate

Answer: The previous story quoted a leaked document. The agreed one is the one published for public debate. Yes, the fiscal impact for 2026 is higher than in the leaked document and smaller for 2025. But the leaked document didn't mention that the government would implement two sets of measures. So, we assume that the next set of measures will increase the fiscal impact for 2025.

Question: Please can you point me to the source to check on the amounts issued for retail bonds this year?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Treasury launches sixth retail bond issue in Fidelis scheme, at lower rates

Answer: You can find all amounts for each year since launch for both schemes here: https://mfinante.gov.ro/en/web/trezor/subscrieri-realizate-prin-tezaur-%C8%99i-fidelis

Question:

How much indirect impact do you estimate on the CPI?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: BOTAS hikes residential gas tariffs by 24.6%, industrial tariffs by 7.9% in July

Answer:

We note quantifying the indirect effects is non-trivial.

In this regard, this study offers a useful benchmark. Table 1 shows that the indirect pass-through from natural-gas tariff changes amounts to at least one-half of their direct contribution, implying an additional impact of ≥ 0.23pps. Hence, the combined net and indirect influence should be no less than 0.7pps based on the paper.

Note, however, that the research is conducted in 2020, and VAR coefficients are highly sample-sensitive, to the best of our knowledge. For a precise, up-to-date estimate, we recommend replicating the analysis with the latest observations.

Question:

How much of the gold exports increase is due to the higher price, how much is due to higher volumes of exports, and what is gold production like - is it increasing more broadly in the country? Also, has the CB been participating in any of this gold selling - perhaps in an effort to diversify FX reserves? Thanks.

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Uzbekistan's gold exports reach USD 6.49bn over five months

Answer:

It is a combination of the two, with a larger contribution from price. Uzbekistan exported 56 tons of gold during Jan-May 2024 and 64 tons of gold during Jan-May 2025. Hence, about a quarter of the higher export proceeds are due to volume and the rest to price.

Yes, the CBU was a net seller of gold, with 25 tons during Jan-May 2024, and 26 tons during Jan-May. However, there has been virtually no change in the physical volume of gold holdings of the CBU as their gold purchases must meet the principle of (money supply) neutrality. This means that they buy gold from private producers for UZS, sell this gold abroad for USD and then re-sell that foreign exchange domestically for UZS. Up until 2020, only the CBU could sell gold abroad, but a 2020 presidential decree granted individuals and private entities the right to export gold bullion and CBU-issued precious metal coins-without quotas-pending proper certification and customs documentation.

Gold production was about 100 tons per year in recent years, but increased to 120 tons in 2024 due to new investment, expanded mining capacity, and improved operations.

Question:

What's the timeline for oral arguments/decision in the US Second Court of Appeals? Would the government appeal to the Supreme Court if the appeals court upholds? Would the Trump administration get involved to help Milei? Is the transfer of YPF shares enforceable?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Govt to appeal YPF ruling, not clear it opens up to settlements talks

Answer:

What's the timeline for oral arguments/decision in the US Second Court of Appeals?

The appeal was filed nearly two years ago and the briefing was completed some 300 days ago. Assuming the appeals court will not deny the request for oral argument, like Preska just did in her ruling on the YPF shares, the date could be set at any time. We understand we are already at the point where the court would be expected to set a date.

We can't provide any estimate as to when the appeals court would issue its ruling. There are too many moving parts. It's highly unlikely, but not impossible, that the court could dismiss oral trial, meaning a brief resolution. It's also possible that the appeal process takes years because there are at least three big points of contention (jurisdiction, damages calculation date, and pre-judgment interest).

Would the government appeal to the Supreme Court if the appeals court upholds?

The government would appeal if it makes financial sense to keep delaying enforcement of the ruling. At this stage, there is probably some hope that the appeals court will overrule Preska on the interpretations that led to this inflated USD 16bn judgment. If the appeals court upholds Preska this possibility would mostly evaporate, but the government could still appeal to the Supreme Court if it believes it makes sense to gain more time until sitting down for settlement negotiations.

As for whether it makes sense to keep delaying a settlement, this is a double-edged strategy of course, since the closer we get to a final ruling on the USD 16bn, the lesser the haircut Burford Capital will be willing to accept on the award.

Before this latest Preska ruling, the government was delaying a settlement because the timing to launch global bonds didn't suit its plans, not because it had high hopes of the award getting cut. The government probably believed the market wasn't properly evaluating this contingent liability, so having to launch a global bond at double-digit yield to pay a settlement would raise more concern about external debt sustainability than simply keeping the legal awards in the background. They probably imagined a scenario where Milei won the midterms convincingly, the sovereign returned to markets triumphantly in January by issuing some USD 5.0bn at 6%-7% to rollover the next round of FX bond payments, achieving a further reduction in borrowing costs by showing the world it regained market access to make debt sustainable, and then they sat down to settle legal cases.

It will be interesting to see if this changes now that the Preska ruling raised more awareness about the risks of keeping this case without settlement. We imagine the government will at least try to delay a settlement until after the October midterm elections, hoping a win there still leads to a significant decline in borrowing costs. But it's possible that the sequencing will have to be the reverse now, with the government unable to return to global bond markets at reasonable cost unless it shows it can reach a settlement on these legal cases.

Would the Trump administration get involved to help Milei?

The US Department of Justice already participated through an Amicus Curiae arguing against the YPF shares transfer and it did no good. The US government supported Argentina at the IMF, and that's the sort of backing we would expect the Trump administration to provide. It's hard for us to imagine there would be any other form of involvement in this legal process.

Is this last ruling on the transfer of YPF shares enforceable?

The government argues that it can't fulfill the order unless Congress approves a law to enable it to transfer the shares. This seems a weak defense that Preska has already rejected. The shares are under local custody, so direct enforcement doesn't appear to be a real possibility.

Question:

Is it possible to see a time series of this data please?

Answer:

I do not keep time series but you can find such in the latest report published on the IVC website (link to the Q1 report). I found the Q2 report quoted by local media only and I believe it has not been uploaded on the IVC website yet. When published, it should appear here.

The Startup Nation Central also has its reports online and they contain time series. You can reach the last one here. I was not able to find the Q2 report on their website either but only quoted by local media.

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Tech companies raise USD 2.72bn in Q2 - IVC-LeumiTech

Question:

Why the figures you report as finance law 2025 have changed so much since this publication? The recent ones would point to a defict well above what MOF has. could you explain?

Answer:

The main reason for the differing figures is a recent change in our data source. Until March, we were using the monthly report from the Finance Ministry. Unfortunately, access to their website has become restricted and difficult to use from non-Moroccan IP addresses, even with a VPN. We're working to resolve this, but in the meantime, we've switched to reporting monthly data from the General Treasury of the Kingdom (TGR), which actually releases its figures earlier than the Ministry. That said, the two institutions use different methodologies.

The TGR bulletin is accounting-based-it reports on cash flows, i.e. actual payments and receipts. The Finance Ministry, by contrast, adheres to international statistical standards and focuses on economic flows incurred during the period, not just cash movements. Indeed the difference in the budget deficit figure is significant and from what I see this is mostly due to the different way they account for expenditures. For example, I can see the investment spending plan for the year at the TGR is MAD 128bn as compared to MAD105bn in the Finance Ministry's plan.

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Central government budget accumulates MAD 6.9bn deficit in Jan

Question:

Do we know what amount of debt is held my multilaterals and whether they will be treated the same as commercial lenders under the G20 framework which will require them to take a haircut on their debt? I ask in light of the Afreximbank treatment of debt with Ghana.

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Country agrees debt restructuring deal with official creditors

Answer:

As of Jun 30, 2024, Ethiopia's total external public debt stood at USD 28.89bn, of which USD 15.56bn (about 54% of total external debt) is owed to multilateral institutions, according to the Finance Ministry latest debt report. Under the G20 Common Framework, our research shows that only official bilateral and private creditors must take comparable haircuts while multilateral development banks retain preferred-creditor status and aren't forced to write down principal. Instead, they'll offer extended maturities or concessional refinancing.

Regarding the Afreximbank-Ghana case, our view is that Ghana owes Afreximbank roughly USD 768.4mn and has insisted on including that debt in its general restructuring envelope, arguing Afreximbank does not enjoy preferred-creditor status. Afreximbank, however, maintains its loans are senior and outside any haircut, leading to a stalemate. That precedent shows regional MDBs can contest their treatment. So, for Ethiopia, any loans from Afreximbank or similar institutions may also need explicit agreement on whether they fall under the G20 Common Framework's comparability clause. See the table below for the list of external debt creditors provided by the Finance Ministry:

Question:

There's a World Bank report published in July incorporating a sharp decline in external debt over the next few years, alongside a call with Ministry of Finance. Do you have any further details on this?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Supplementary budget approval

Answer:

We assume this question is referring to the latest World Bank's economic report on Zambia titled "leveraging energy transition minerals for economic transformation". If so, then the WB projection of Zambia's external debt falling sharply from 86.4% of GDP in 2023 to 41.6% by 2027 stems directly from successful debt restructuring and fiscal discipline. Essentially, Zambia has swapped near-term debt pressures for longer maturities, cutting annual repayments significantly. For example, the Ministry of Finance's latest data (Q1 2025 Debt Bulletin, Table 23) which you can download here shows public external debt projected repayments will drop to USD 813.5mn in 2025 (down from USD 1.37bn in 2024), then plateau around USD 1.07-USD 1.08bn through 2027. This breather allows fiscal space to address legacy arrears like the ZMW 55bn VAT backlog, which forced June's proposed supplementary budget.

However, this progress isn't risk-free. While the restructuring deferred a substantial amount of bilateral debt, a significant portion of Zambia's total public debt still matures within a few years' time, a refinancing cliff that demands careful liquidity management. Add to this the kwacha's vulnerability (66.7% of debt is FX-denominated) and copper price volatility, and you see why the World Bank urges mineral revenue safeguards. The MoF is tackling this via VAT reforms (e.g., Smart Invoices to curb fraud), but execution will make or break the debt trajectory.

Below is our assessment of how the World Bank's projections align with the Ministry of Finance's current debt repayment schedule. This alignment remains subject to change, particularly if additional borrowing materializes such as through the proposed supplementary budget. However, the extent of future fiscal pressures is uncertain, given elevated downside risks, including the ongoing drought and persistent energy shortages.

Question:

Has parliament reviewed and is a formal approval expected?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Supplementary budget necessitated by legacy debt, mining VAT arrears - FinMin

Answer:

As of now, there has been no official update on whether the Expanded Planning and Budgeting Committee has reviewed the supplementary budget estimates. The committee was initially expected to submit its report to Parliament by Tuesday, July 1. However, no confirmation has been provided yet. In terms of approval, we expect the supplementary budget to pass without major hurdles. It only requires a simple majority, which the ruling UPND comfortably holds, despite criticism from some opposition members over the government's rising debt levels. You can access the full budget presentation made by the finance minister to Parliament here.

Once the supplementary budget is formally approved and the Finance Ministry releases updated figures, we will provide a revised estimate of the fiscal balance.

Question:

What are the best indicators to track domestic credit on a high frequency basis?

Answer:

The Reserve Bank of India releases weekly commercial credit details (every Friday) as part of its Bulletin Weekly Statistical Supplement. The latest is available here. This covers bank credit, food credit and Non-food credit. Additionally, the RBI releases detailed commercial credit data once a month, titled Sectoral Deployment of Credit. The latest is available here.

The data are provisional. Bank credit, food credit, and non-food credit figures are based on the fortnightly Section 42 return, which covers all scheduled commercial banks (SCBs). Sectoral non-food credit data are sourced from the sector- and industry-wise bank credit (SIBC) return, which includes select banks representing approximately 95% of total non-food credit extended by all SCBs. This dataset reflects credit outstanding as of the last reporting Friday of each month and may not fully capture intra-month trends.

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Gross GST collection rises 6.2% y/y to INR 1.84tn in May

Question:

Are there any restrictions on these consumption vouchers, or is it very simply the same as a cash handout?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Rival parties reach agreement on KRW 13.2tn consumption vouchers program

Answer:

In short, yes there will be restrictions and they won't be simply cash handouts, but exact restrictions on the coupons still haven't been determined. The biggest beneficiary are expected to be local convenience stores as the government is reportedly mulling over banning the use of consumption in department stores and large marts.

In terms of services, the coupons can be also spent in accommodation, movies, art exhibitions, performing arts, and sports facilities. However, their usage is restricted in entertainment and social gathering places, including gambling businesses. In addition, they can't be used to repay loans, make deposits or pay for tuition.

That said, many of the businesses where the coupons cannot be spent are still expected to benefit from a trickle down effect given that most recipients will likely use them for groceries which will free up spending on other things. In addition, the fact that the coupons will be provided during the summer also bodes well for consumption.

Question:

When will the official court case be?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Constitutional Court to decide on Jul 1 whether to suspend PM from duties

Answer:

PM Paetongtarn has some 15 days to prepare her defense and formally respond to the allegations against her. Thus, I think that the case can be expected to start in the second half of July, even though there is no official timeline announced by the Constitutional Court.

Looking at the very similar constitutional case involving former PM Srettha Travisin from last year, the Constitutional Court decided to accept the petition against Srettha on May 23, 2024, the formal hearings in the case started on June 18 and Srettha was officially dismissed as PM on August 14. So it was 26 days between the decision to accept the petition and start the trial, and 83 days until the final verdict.