Question:

Is this data publicly available? If so, where can we find it?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Home prices pick up growth to 8.3% y/y in Q2 2026 - CBA

Answer:

The entire set of data can be found here:

https://www.cbamonitor.cz/kategorie/ceny-nemovitosti

In particular, the series on ask prices is here:

https://www.cbamonitor.cz/statistika/vyvoj-nabidkovych-cen-nemovitosti

Meanwhile, the data on property sale prices can be found here:

https://www.cbamonitor.cz/statistika/ceny-rodinnych-domu-pocet-transakci

In both cases, there is a downloadable file below the chart's footnotes.

Question:

Can you explain where the main differences between the state budget and the general budget deficit lie? This is quite a large proposed increased in the state budget deficit. How is the state deficit financed?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Finance ministry proposes a fiscal deficit at 2.8% of GDP in 2027

Answer:

Here is the basic budget level definition:

general government = central government (state government + extra-budgetary funds) + local governments + social security funds

What is included in extra-budgetary funds varies considerably from country to country. In the case of the Czech Republic, such entities are relatively few, and you can see the full list here:

https://mf.gov.cz/assets/attachments/Government-Finance-Statistics-Methodology.pdf

Generally, the difference between central and state government in the Czech Republic is negligibly small, and you may see the two terms used interchangeably, even if they are technically different. Local governments tend to end up with small surpluses, usually around 0.5-0.6% of GDP, while social security funds usually have a nearly balanced budget, ranging between a deficit at 0.1% of GDP to a surplus at 0.1% of GDP.

There is an additional difference, as the state government budget is reported in cash terms, while the general government budget is reported in accrued terms (under ESA 2010). In most years, the difference tends to be small, but 2025 was an example when expected payments from the EU budget were delayed, so they are being reported as revenues in the 2026 state government budget, rather than the 2025 one. This doesn't happen often, but you should keep in mind that there is a methodological difference.

The state government budget deficit is funded primarily through debt securities issued under Czech law, and to a lesser extent by bilateral loans, mostly from IFIs (EIB, EU, EBRD, etc.) To give you some context, debt securities accounted for 95.1% of total state government debt at the end of Q2. The bigger part is government bonds, at 90.5% of the total, and the rest is money market instruments. State government debt is primarily in local currency, with fx-denominated debt adding up to 5.1% of the total at end-Q2, and net fx exposure - to 4.5% of the total.

Regarding the proposed state government deficit target, it will indeed increase considerably, which has already drawn criticism. The formal argument is that the government wants to boost public investment in infrastructure and healthcare. At this point, the government's solution is that it plans to borrow more. Technically, the 2027 budget proposal indicates that fiscal consolidation should start in 2028, but we don't believe this government is committed to the proposed targets. In particular, the general government deficit should decrease to 2.0% of GDP in 2028, 1.6% of GDP in 2029, and 1.2% of GDP in 2030. Given that 2029 is an election year, we just don't believe that these targets will survive. Our suspicion is that these numbers were included to reduce the potential concerns of the European Commission. As far as debt levels are concerned, general government debt is still at a relatively moderate level, at 44.1% of GDP at the end of Q1 (Maastricht criteria). Yet, given the rate at which fiscal policy will loosen, we expect that debt levels will near 50% of GDP at the end of the decade.

A problematic debt level will be 55% of GDP, as debt over this threshold triggers immediate corrective action under Czech fiscal rules. However, these have just been loosened, so there will not be much of an incentive to lower fiscal deficits under this government. The next government will likely need to deal with high debt levels, but the current ruling parties are not known for being forward-looking.

Question:

Do you have the NBH clarifying statement please? I do not see it.

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Rate cuts dependent on September inflation forecast - NBH

Answer:

The NBH has not published this reaction on its website, as far as we can see. The news portal Portfolio reported it and we also saw the same report in Reuters, although we cannot find the Reuters link at the moment. We believe Reuters was the original source. Reuters based the report on NBH comments sent in response to queries on Bloomberg's report, making us think that Reuters contacted the NBH and received this response.

Question:

Did Hungary update its funding sources for 2026? Is there a new figure for external bond issuance? Do you have a table of the original financing plan you could send?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Budget deficit expands by 2.6% y/y to HUF 2,857.9bn in Jan-Jul

Answer:

No, not yet. AKK head Tardos last said the financing plan will be updated very soon, without being more specific what this meant. We think that the external bond issuance plan might not be revised, while the higher deficit compared to the previous expectations could be covered by the RRF loans and potentially a SAFE loan as well. Hungary still has a chance to secure a payment from the SAFE instrument this year, we think.

This is our story on the original debt financing plan containing a table with gross and net issuance. You can find the detailed debt financing strategy from the AKK at this link.

Question:

What is the source of the debt forecasts mentioned in this story? Is there also a table available for that?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Govt's 2027 budget puts public debt a hair below key level, highlighting risks

Answer:

The source for all of the debt forecasts is the Finance Ministry budget. In particular, they are from the document whose title is translated as "Justification for the draft budget act for 2027." They come from Pg. 48 and the following table:

Question:

Can President Nawrocki veto the tax hikes, but not the PIT cuts?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: President seen as likely to veto KO's main tax cuts and hikes

Answer:

As far as I know, the president cannot veto just part of the bill. I think if he wanted to sign some and contest some, he could sign the bill, but ask the Constitutional Tribunal to look at the constitutionality of the tax increases (he might, for instance, challenge them as being unfair treatment of taxpayers). In this case, the bill would go into effect, but there might be a future challenge to the tax increases.

This would bring the matter into the messy dispute between the government and president over the PiS-controlled Tribunal. So far, the government has simply ignored Tribunal rulings, in part since the Tribunal's status has been questioned by European bodies.

As I suggested in the story, there is a strong political edge to the tax proposals. No doubt many middle class Poles have faced higher taxes because the tax thresholds have not been updated, but this is a core political dispute and both sides are trying to make the other look bad.

I am eagerly awaiting more work on the bill, which will hopefully give the president's team time to take a more explicit stance.

Question:

Where can I find the full document for Poland's 2027 budget?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Govt adopts draft 2027 budget with general govt deficit at 7.1% of GDP

Answer:

The Polish Finance Ministry published the draft budget here. To note, it is only in Polish. I have published a story with the main tables (here).

Question:

Could you please share a link to this article? "'AI-flation' is already draining wallets [higher energy, electronics, and software prices related to AI are eroding purchasing power] (Rzeczpospolita)"

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Press Mood of the Day

Answer:

Here is the link: https://cyfrowa.rp.pl/ai/art45034821-miala-obnizac-koszty-a-drenuje-portfele-nadchodzi-nowe-zjawisko-ai-flacja.

The translated version is below:

It was supposed to lower costs, but instead it's draining wallets. A new phenomenon is emerging: "AI-flation."

Artificial intelligence was supposed to increase productivity and reduce costs, but so far it's also yielding less-than-expected results. Massive investments in data centers and AI infrastructure are driving up the prices of energy, electronics, and software.

The investment boom surrounding artificial intelligence is reminiscent of earlier technological revolutions. Electrification, railway construction, and the development of the internet also required enormous investments, which initially drove up the prices of raw materials, energy, and services. Only after the infrastructure was built did they begin to deliver lasting productivity gains and cost reductions. Today, AI is following a similar path.

The AI ​​investment boom-with spending estimated by JP Morgan at around $750 billion this year-is starting to impact inflation. Spending on data center construction, electricity, computer memory, and infrastructure is rising. As economists quoted by CNN note, while AI's impact on overall inflation remains small, it is already clearly felt in select sectors.

The United States, in the midst of the AI ​​and data center boom, is feeling the brunt of this. Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody's Analytics, estimates that the inflationary impact of the AI ​​boom is increasing the average American household's spending by more than $375 annually.

This phenomenon is beginning to be called "AI-flation"-a situation in which the arms race between tech giants directly raises the cost of living for ordinary consumers. Before technology begins to lower labor and service costs through automation, its development may drive up the prices of energy, electronics, and some digital services.

AI is increasing energy bills

The most visible consequence of the AI ​​boom is the increase in energy demand. Data centers consume vast amounts of electricity and water, and their number is growing much faster than new generation capacity. The US grid operator, PJM Interconnection, warns that data centers are being built up to three times faster than the power plants capable of powering them. Furthermore, the system is being strained by coal-fired power plant closures, transportation electrification, and aging infrastructure. All of this creates a temporary imbalance between energy demand and supply.

"Data centers are willing to pay virtually any price for energy. This increases wholesale prices and, consequently, household bills," Pooja Sriram, an economist at Barclays, told CNN.

Electricity prices for US households were about 4 percent higher in June than a year earlier.

Data center boom drives up prices of electronics and digital services

AI is also increasing demand for specialized memory used in servers. Semiconductor manufacturers are directing production capacity toward the most profitable chips for data centers, limiting the supply of components used in consumer electronics.

The effect is already visible in the data. According to BLS data, prices for electronic components and accessories manufacturers were 27.6% higher in June than a year earlier.

This is starting to impact the prices of finished devices. Apple raised prices for MacBooks, iPads, and other device components in June, citing a sharp rise in memory and storage costs. Game consoles and other electronic devices are also becoming more expensive.

For years, computers have steadily declined in price thanks to technological advancements. However, in the first half of 2026, this trend was interrupted.

The cost of digital services is also rising. Tech companies are increasingly charging for features that leverage generative AI. Microsoft raised the prices of some Microsoft 365 subscriptions after incorporating the Copilot feature. Other software vendors, which must finance costly AI infrastructure, are announcing similar changes.

As CNN notes, economists expect AI-related inflationary pressures to spread to other sectors of the economy as infrastructure continues to expand and generative AI models become more popular.

The AI ​​paradox is therefore one of time lag: the promised savings resulting from greater productivity may only materialize later, while the economy is already bearing the costs of building the infrastructure needed to achieve them.

AI inflation is also reaching Poland

The expansion of data centers affects not only energy and electronics prices. It also increases demand for copper, cabling, construction materials, and skilled workers. Thierry Wizman of Macquarie Group points out that rising wages in the construction industry could, over time, translate into higher real estate prices, especially in regions where new data centers are being built.

Poland could also be impacted by this trend. The country is becoming an attractive location for new data centers thanks to its developing infrastructure and location in Central Europe. However, this means increased competition for electricity, land, specialists, and connection capacity, which could eventually impact the costs of doing business even outside the technology sector. Industry forecasts predict that the capacity of Polish data centers could increase to at least 500 MW by the end of the decade, more than doubling its current level. This figure may seem modest nationwide. However, given government policies and the growing emphasis on "digital sovereignty," these forecasts may prove overly conservative. The problem is that even a small share nationwide is concentrated locally and operates continuously (24/7), creating local but noticeable bottlenecks in overloaded network nodes.

In Poland, this is compounded by the already costly energy transition. The need to modernize transmission networks to accommodate energy-intensive digital hubs means multi-billion dollar outlays for operators, which could translate into higher tariffs.

Polish consumers, however, may already be experiencing the global effects of the AI ​​boom in the prices of electronics and some digital services. If the pace of investment in AI continues at its current level, its impact on inflation could become much more noticeable in the coming years.

Question: Can the 2027 budget be drafted without a functioning government? Is it up to interpretation of Article 110(4) of the Constitution, or is it clearer that the budget cannot be drafted until we get a full government?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: President Dan to designate new PM in coming days

Answer: The obstacle to approving the 2027 budget laws is not the fact that we currently have an interim cabinet, but the absence of a parliamentary majority. Even a caretaker government can draft the budget laws, submit them to MPs, and the fiscal‑budget committee could take them over as legislative initiatives, as happened with several laws linked to NRRP milestones. But this would still require majority support in the parliament.

It's true that Article 110(4) does not explicitly forbid legislative initiative, and recent constitutional analysis supports the idea that drafting the budget falls under administering public affairs. However, we don't think the budget could be adopted until a full government is sworn in, because MPs would not assume that responsibility without a stable political support behind it.

Question:

Could you provide historical PMI data and USD/KZT data for the same period?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Manufacturing PMI falls to 46.0 in August

Answer:

Data covering Nov 2019 - Aug 2026 can be found here.

Question:

Hi, in this table https://thot-arquivos.tesouro.gov.br/publicacao/55499 I find a total of 89bn BRL in precarious in the various tables on page 13-14 for July YTD. Where did you find the BRL 35.6bn figure?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Central govt primary surplus reaches above-consensus BRL 10.8bn in July

Answer:

The information regarding the BRL 35.6bn was an editing error. We apologize for this. A corrected version of the story is now online.

The BRL 35.6bn figure represents the difference between the total amount of court-ordered debts (precatórios) paid in H1 2026 and the amount paid over the same period in 2025, as indicated by the government in its June bulletin (note 14 on page 10). In 2026, the government concentrated precatório payments in March, which worsened the primary balance throughout the first half of the year. In 2025, these payments were concentrated in July. Now that the July 2026 data are available, the year-on-year comparison will be less distorted, allowing for a more straightforward assessment of compliance with the fiscal target.

Disregarding the precatórios included in social security and personnel expenditures, the government spent BRL 37.7bn in Jan-Jul 2026, compared with BRL 37.9bn the year before.

Our expectation remains that the government will meet its fiscal target of a 0.25% of GDP primary surplus within the lower bound of the target range (-0.25% of GDP, or a zero deficit), but only due to exceptions to the fiscal framework, thus still posting a de facto deficit.

Question:

Has the government explained the rationale for the Finance Ministry's budget increase in the recast 2027 budget?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: Budget row erupts over hidden debt as 2027 debt service surges to COP 155.4tn

Answer:

Your question has been top of mind for us since we started reviewing the recast 2027 budget. So far, there has been no official explanation for the Finance Ministry's budget increase. Still, the recast budget documents offer some clues, and some appear to contradict the de la Espriella government's stated commitment to austerity.

The recast 2027 budget itself contains several internal inconsistencies and raises more questions than it answers. The proposal was put together in a rush because of tight deadlines. The government took office on Aug 7. Then, after the earthquake on Aug 10, it was given room to review the budget, but had to do so before Aug 30.

We have been taking a closer look at the recast 2027 budget and comparing it with the 2026 budget currently in force. Within the Finance Ministry's payroll, the new administration proposes staffing of 25,447 positions in 2027, the same number as proposed in the 2026 budget by the Petro administration. That said, the cost rises from COP 4.179tn to COP 4.454tn, an increase of 6.6% from the 2026 budget, slightly below the inflation forecasts from BanRep (6.9%) and the ministry itself (6.8%).

Because headcount would be unchanged in 2027 relative to 2026 and the wage bill rises broadly in line with projected inflation, payroll does not appear to explain the bulk of the proposed increase in operating spending for the Finance Ministry in 2027. That could point to greater procurement of goods and services. However, the de la Espriella administration's 2027 budget proposal explicitly states that "the planning of goods and services procurement was carried out in accordance with the spending austerity guidelines issued by the national government" and that, for 2027, this category remains constant in nominal terms compared with 2026.

That leaves other operating categories in the recast 2027 budget, including non-payroll personal services and general expenses such as fees and travel allowances. But it is hard to see how these categories alone could account for nearly COP 14tn (the proposed increase in the ministry's 2027 budget), which is almost 70% of the COP 21.9tn in spending cuts announced by FinMin Miguel Gómez on Aug 29 for the remainder of 2026.

In fact, during the first session of the recast 2027 budget discussions in Congress on Sep 1, Senator Sara Castellanos of the National Salvation Party asked the government to first explain the announced fiscal adjustment bill, so lawmakers know exactly where the cuts will be made. As she put it, "the budget cannot be approved blindly." Amid a fragmented Congress, her view matters because the party was founded in the 1990s by the finance minister's uncle, and its current leader, Enrique Gómez, is the minister's brother. Castellanos also made clear that the recast 2027 budget should not be approved without clarity on the cuts or on why the Ministry of Finance's allocation increased by 45%. Our calculation puts the increase closer to 54%.

The new government has criticized its predecessor for its lack of transparency. Yet a closer look at this recast 2027 budget proposal raises similar concerns.

We hope these questions and other concerns can be resolved soon. Several lawmakers and analysts already argue that the new budget must be clearer about what the ministry truly intends to do and what fiscal path it should follow. At the time of writing, we share that view.

Questions:

(1) Do you assign CIEES the same weight as Comunicaliza or Cedatos?

(2) Their approvals seem to have been below 50% for quite some time now. Do you have a longer time series?

The questions were asked in relation to the following story: Noboa approval rebounds to 32% on fuel price cuts - CIEES poll

Answer:

CIEES is an Ecuadorian firm founded in 2008, so it does not have CEDATOS's 51-year institutional track record. From a "traditional" standpoint, we consider CEDATOS to be the benchmark.

In our experience, CIEES polls are increasingly mentioned in the press, although their niche is concentrated in urban areas, mainly Quito and Guayaquil, with a relatively small sample size, just over 800 respondents. By comparison, Comunicaliza's polls can exceed 4,000 cases and include more questions, giving them broader scope and greater depth, especially when surveying peripheral regions. Here, for example, is the April poll. Some critics have recently argued that Comunicaliza is a "covert agency" of the government, of course, with no hard evidence behind the claim.

Noboa's consistently low approval rating in the CIEES surveys could reflect either broader dissatisfaction or a sample tilted toward more government-critical respondents, but the poll does not provide enough detail to distinguish between those possibilities. The August poll, for example, simply stated that the respondents were "citizens residing in Quito and Guayaquil, aged 16 and older." You can find the full report here. That being said, you'll see this disclaimer at the beginning: "Data mining on the 2024-2025 series identified structural pessimism as the main driving force behind public opinion, along with a core group of 'consistent optimists' accounting for 28.9%." We think this supports your observation that approval ratings have been well below average for a long time.

We are speaking directly with CIEES to see if we can get historical data, ideally up to 2025. We'll follow up on that point. The monthly reports aren't consistent in what they disclose; many present only the relevant data for the month, and in 2025, for example, the published polls focused mostly on the referendum. We'll follow up as soon as we have more on the historical series.

Question:

What were the Jan to July figures in 2025, so we can compare this period y/y for the 7 months?

The question was asked in relation to the following story: NNPC remits NGN 7.91tn to Federation Account from Jan to July

Answer:

According to the Aug 2025 summary report, the figure for the first 7 months was NGN 8.86tn. So, the first 7 months of 2026 are down 10.7% y/y. It appears the main reason is lower actual crude and condensate sales volumes which are weaker in several months of 2026 compared with 2025. July 2026 was down to 21.5mn barrels, from 25.5mn in July 2025 (-15.7%). May was very weak (18.95mn in 2026 versus 24.8mn in 2025, -23.6%). The lower sales volumes are likely due to the rising crude allocations to domestic refining and barrels pre-committed under forward-sale arrangements.